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Reserve prices (or minimum bids) are widely used in various auction structures and 
influence bid prices when imposed. Riley and Samuelson (1981) extend Vickrey (1961) 
to include a reserve price in an independent private values auction, and theoretically 
illustrate several possible outcomes when a seller imposes a reserve price. They show that 
reserve prices can increase buyers’ bid prices, decrease buyers’ revenues, increase 
sellers’ revenues, and decrease the probability of the item being sold. The theoretical 
predictions in these papers are the foundation for much of the literature on reserve prices 
in auctions. 
 Riley and Samuelson’s (1981) independent private values auction model has been 
used to estimate the impact of reserve prices in real estate auctions (McAfee, Quan, and 
Vincent 2002), timber auctions (Paarsch 1997), and oil lease auctions (Hendricks et al. 
1994). Today, nearly anyone with computer access can set up an eBay account and sell 
various items with a reserve price in an online auction (Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; Reiley 
2006). Using data from online auctions such as eBay has become a popular approach to 
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analyze the impacts of reserve prices. For example, Reiley (2006) sold Magic: The 
Gathering game cards on eBay without a reserve price and with various levels of reserve 
prices. As predicted, Reiley (2006) finds that increasing the reserve price decreases the 
number of buyers participating in the auction, which suggests that reserve prices can act 
as a barrier to entry for buyers. Also, buyers’ bid prices increased when a reserve price 
was imposed by the seller. Reiley (2006) follows Riley and Samuelson’s (1981) 
independent private values auction model to make these conclusions; even though Reiley 
(2006 p. 198) acknowledges that common-value auction theory could be argued as more 
appropriate. Reiley (2006) finds support for Riley and Samuelson’s (1981) hypotheses 
about the impacts of a reserve price in an auction.  
Little attention, however, has been given to the influence of a reserve price on a 
common-value auction. A general theoretical framework for a common-value auction 
with a reserve price is introduced by McAfee and Vincent (1992). They allow the number 
of buyers to be endogenous in finding the optimal reserve price, and they find the reserve 
price set by the government in oil lease auctions is less then optimal. Levin and Smith 
(1996) expand on Riley and Samuelson’s (1981) theoretical model and include a 
common-value auction as a special case. Their theoretical model shows that the optimal 
reserve price is a function of the number of buyers participating in the auction and 
approaches the sellers’ true values as the number of buyers participating in the auction 
increases. These theoretical papers give some insight into the effects of a reserve price in 
a common-value auction, but do not solve for equilibriums of the common-value auction. 
More recently, Goncalves (2009) established an online second-price sealed-bid common-
value auction, and found that the seller can increase revenue by setting a reserve price. 
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With a reserve price, the seller is able to increase the bid price, but the quantity sold 
decreases (Goncalves 2009). Conversely, setting the reserve price above the highest bid 
price offered by the buyers in the auction results in a reduction in the seller’s revenues 
(Goncalves 2009). Additionally, Goncalves (2009) finds that increasing competition by 
including an additional buyer does not increase revenues as much as letting the seller 
impose a reserve price. Reiley (2006) refers to experiments similar to his and Goncalves 
(2009) as “field experiments.” These field experiments cannot control for all the 
exogenous factors that might influence the results like in a laboratory experiment (Reiley 
2006). The results from these types of studies are recognized by Reiley (2006) and 
Goncalves (2009) as being noisy, and that reproducing them under controlled laboratory 
settings could be beneficial to further test the theory. However, human experiments in 
controlled laboratories can be expensive.  
An alternative technique that economists can use to test economic theories other 
than using human or field experiments is agent-based computational modeling (Arifovic 
1996; Bonabeua 2002; Alkemade, La Poutré, and Ammam 2006). Agent-based 
computational models are artificial markets where interactive agents trade (Tesfatsion 
2001). These models can simulate artificial economic markets when data are not 
available or are expensive to obtain and when there is not an analytical solution. 
Equilibrium prices in various auction markets have been successfully obtained with 
agent-based models (Tesfatsion 2001; Guerci, Stefano, and Cincotti. 2008; Hailu and 
Thoyer 2010). Our review of literature shows the impact of a reserve price in a first-price 
common-value auction on revenues, bid prices, and the probability of a transaction 
occurring has not been measured with a theoretical model, or with an agent-based model. 
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The analytical solution of a first-price common-value auction with a reserve price is 
perhaps infeasible (Gordy 1998), and reproducing this auction in a laboratory experiment 
is likely expensive. Thus, using an agent-based auction model is an appropriate method to 
find the equilibrium bid price and optimal reserve price in a first-price common-value 
auction. Additionally, a first-price common-value auction with a reserve price has never 
been solved using an agent-based computational model, which makes this model a unique 
contribution to the agent-based model literature.  
The base model we establish is an agent-based first-price common-value auction 
similar to Kagel and Levin’s (1986) common-value auction model. The objective is to 
evaluate the impact of a reserve price in this artificial auction and to determine buyers’ 
optimal bid prices and sellers’ optimal reserve prices. Buyers choose their expected-
revenue-maximizing bid price for the item being sold while sellers choose their expected-
revenue-maximizing reserve price. Buyers and sellers use a particle swarm optimization 
(PSO) learning algorithm developed by Eberhart and Kennedy (1995) and extended by 
Zhang and Brorsen (2009) to maximize expected revenue. The PSO algorithm uses the 
buyers’ and sellers’ previous and current best bid/reserve strategies to direct their next 
bid/reserve strategies to the expected revenue maximizing solution. The results will also 
inform us on the influence of a reserve price on market power (bid-shading) and 
overbidding (the winner’s curse) in a first-price common-value artificial auction. Kagel 
and Levin’s (1986) common-value auction theory assumes bids are uniformly distributed, 
and in the base model, we follow this assumption. The agent-based model provides an 
opportunity to extend Kagel and Levin’s (1986) theory by giving one of the buyers a 





Common Value Auction  
Auctions are normally classified into three types: (1) common value, (2) private value, 
and (3) affiliated value (Milgrom and Weber 1982; Krishna 2002). In a common-value 
auction, the resale value of the item is equal across all buyers (Kagel and Levin 1986; 
Kagel and Levin 2002). However, uncertainty about the value of the item being sold 
results in each buyer having a different estimate of value such as in oil lease auctions 
(Kagel and Levin 1986; Kagel and Levin 2002). Private value auction bids are 
determined by a buyer’s independent private value for the item (Paarsch 1992). The value 
of the item for each buyer is unique to that buyer and each buyer knows his/her value 
with certainty, but the value of the item for other buyers is unknown. A private value 
auction typically includes non-durable items that are unique such as art (Paarsch 1992). 
The affiliated value auction is an intermediary case where the value of the item differs 
across buyers, but each buyer’s resale value for the item is similar (Pinkse and Tan 2005). 
In reality, auctions rarely strictly follow the criteria for one of these three types of 
auctions, and they are more likely to be a hybrid of all three auction types (Corrigan and 
Rousu 2011). 
We establish an agent-based, first-price common-value auction model that is 
similar to Kagel and Levin’s (1986) model. The artificial auction is a duopsony and 
oligopsony auction structure, meaning the number of buyers N (N=2 and N =3) is less 
than the number of sellers M. Buyers act as price-setters and sellers are price-takers, 
which could result in buyers imposing market power on sellers by reducing their bids 
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(bid-shading) below the market value (Varian 1992). Bid-shading is possible in various 
auction structures (Robinson 1985; McAfee and McMillan 1987; Klemperer 1999). 
McAfee and McMillan (1987) find that in infinitely repeated oligopoly auction games, a 
collusive outcome is sustainable, and Robinson (1985) finds bid-shading is sustainable 
for a first- and second-price auction.  
On the other hand, a phenomenon of common-value auction theory is the 
winner’s curse (Capen, Clapp, and Campbell 1971). This situation occurs when buyers 
estimate the value of an auctioned item to be greater than its actual value, and bid their 
estimated values for the item. This process results in the winning buyer receiving 
negative profits for the item (Capen, Clapp, and Campbell 1971). The winner’s curse is 
well documented in experimental (Kagel and Levin 2002) and actual (Capen, Clapp, and 
Campbell 1971) common-value auctions. In human experiments, the winner’s curse 
normally increases as the number of bidders increase, and when there are less than three 
buyers, the winner’s curse is close to zero (Kagel and Levin 2002). The winner’s curse 
can also decrease as buyers become more experienced (Kagel and Levin 2002). The PSO 
learning algorithm is similar to giving buyers an artificial experience since previous bid 
prices are considered in determining buyers’ optimal bid prices for the current trading 
period (or iteration). Also, few buyers are participating in the auction. For these reasons, 
we anticipate the winner’s curse will not occur.  
Kagel and Levin (1986) developed a risk-neutral bid function for a first-price 
common-value auction. Their model is derived from Wilson (1977) and Milgrom and 
Weber (1982) and has been tested and supported several times with human experiments 
(Kagel and Levin 2002). Kagel and Levin (1986) assume that in the auction, the retail 
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value of the item is X, which is randomly drawn from a set of values that are uniformly 
distributed in the interval ],[ xx . Buyer i has an information signal xi, which is distributed 
uniformly between a lower bound of max  xxi ,  and an upper bound of min 
 xxi ,  where  is a deterministic value told to buyers before the auction. The bid 
function is 
 ),()(  NYxxb ii   (1.1) 
where xi is buyer i’s information signal, and 
))]()(2/(exp[)]1/(2[   xxNNY i , where N is the number of buyers in the 
auction. Since Y has a negative exponential, it approaches zero as xi becomes greater 
than x and when δ increases. The bid function is assumed to be equal for all buyers so 
the buyer with the highest information signal always wins the item being sold. The bid 
function is substituted into the buyer’s conditional expected revenue function  
]|)),(([]|[ jixxNYxXEjixxRE jiiji
B
i    (1.2) 
where BiR is buyer i’s expected revenue conditional on winning the bid. Kagel and Levin 
(1986) predict the expected revenue conditional on winning is 
)1/(2]|[  NjixxRE ji
B
i  . 
 
Reserve Price 
Riley and Samuelson (1981) were the first to consider the implications of a reserve price 
in an independent private values auction. Their model is clearly derived and discussed, 
which has led to it being a highly followed theory for empirical models (Reiley 2006; 
 
8 
Rosenkranz and Schmitz 2007). Levin and Smith (1996) extend Riley and Samuelson’s 
(1981) independent private values model. They provide comparative statics results to the 
effects of a reserve price for a variety of different auction structures as the number of 
buyers approaches infinity, which includes a common-value auction as a special case. 
They state a reserve price could: (1) be a barrier to entry for buyers in the auction, (2) 
result in increased revenues for the sellers, and (3) not be necessary when a certain 
number of buyers are participating in the auction. Levin and Smith (1996) show that the 
optimal reserve price in the first-price auction should converge to the seller’s true value 
as the number of buyers increases.  
When sellers choose a reserve price, buyers must bid higher than the other 
participants in the auction and bid greater than or equal to the sellers’ reserve prices for 
the transactions to occur. We modify Kagel and Levin’s (1986) common-value auction 
model by including a reserve price. Now buyer i’s conditional expected revenue is 
subject to buyer i bidding higher than buyer j and greater than or equal to the sellers’ 
reserve price r. Buyer i’s expected revenue conditional on winning is  
],|)),(([],|[ jirxxxNYxXEjirxxxRE ijiiiji
B
i   (1.3) 
where r is the reserve price set by the sellers. Buyers with the highest signal will win the 
item being auctioned as long as their signal is greater than the reserve price.  
 The sellers choose a reserve price for the item being sold from previous 
transactions. Sellers only sell their item when the highest bid price is greater than or equal 
to their reserve price; otherwise the sellers choose not to sell. The sellers’ expected 












],|[][  (1.4) 
where ShR  is the expected revenue for seller h. Since this is a first-price auction, sellers 
accept the highest bid price that is greater than or equal to their reserve price.  
Solving a common-value auction analytically is difficult (Gordy 1998), and 
including a reserve price perhaps makes it infeasible. An agent-based artificial auction is 
an appropriate method for determining the implications of a reserve price in a first-price 
common-value auction when buyers choose their optimal bid price and sellers choose 
their optimal reserve price.  
 
Artificial Common Value Auction 
The base artificial auction for this paper is a duopsony first-price common-value auction 
without the sellers imposing a reserve price. Our base model is similar to Kagel and 
Levin’s (1986) model, but we make several slight modifications that are described in the 
next sub-section. Then we allow sellers to choose their optimal reserve price in the 
duopsony artificial auction while buyers choose their optimal bid price. Winning bid 
price for buyers and expected revenues for the seller are compared to determine the 
implications of a reserve price in the duopsony artificial auction. Furthermore, we extend 
Kagel and Levin’s (1986) assumption of symmetric buyers by giving one of the buyers a 
bid function with a normally distributed error term, and giving the other buyer a bid 
function with a uniformly distributed error term. Finally, an additional buyer is 
introduced in the artificial auction making it an oligopsony auction. Results are presented 
for the oligopsony auction when no reserve price is imposed and when a reserve price is 
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imposed. This allows us to determine the implications of a reserve price in an oligopsony 
auction and determine how much an additional buyer increases the price of the item being 
sold.  
 In the model, the buying and selling agents are autonomous entities that follow 
bounded rationality (Simon 1957). Bounded rationality is different from the full 
rationality assumption made in most analytical models and could explain differences 
between analytical solutions and agent-based solutions.  
 
Buyer and Seller Agents 
First, an artificial common-value auction model without a reserve price is established. We 
base our model on Kagel and Levin (1986), but make a few deviations from their model. 
Kagel and Levin (1986) randomly generate the true value of the item in each repeated 
auction because human buyers could learn the true value and base their bids on the true 
value instead of their signal. The true value can increase and decrease due to demand and 
supply factors, but will not influence the bid behavior around the true value; thus, they 
analyze the bid price around the random generated true value of the item each iteration. 
In an agent-based auction, generating a new random true value each iteration is 
unnecessary because buyers are forced to bid based on their signals. The first slight 
modification to Kagel and Levin (1986) is that the agent-based auction assumes a 
constant positive true value for the item being sold, which means we are evaluating bids 
around some constant true value that is greater than zero. Our approach is equivalent to 
imposing an interior solution, so we can eliminate the variable Y in the Kagel and Levin 
(1986) bid function from the buyers’ bid function since it approaches zero as the buyers’ 
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signal moves away from the bounds on the true value. Next, Kagel and Levin (1986) 
restrict the buyer’s bid range between a lower bound of max xxi ,  and an upper 
bound of min xxi , . This restriction is relaxed in the agent-based auction observing 
all possible bid prices for buyers. Without this restriction, Kagel and Levin (1986 p. 899) 
state the optimal bid price defies analytical solution. The bid function we use matches 
Andreoni and Miller’s (1995) proposed common-value bid function for an agent-based 
auction, and is specified as  
 iii xb   (1.5) 
 where bi is the bid price for buyer i, ]1,1[ ix  is the choice variable or bid strategy for 
buyer i with random variable ]1,0[~ Ui . The random variable is subtracted from the 
buyer’s choice variable to follow Kagel and Levin’s (1986) model and to match Andreoni 
and Miller’s (1995) proposed common-value bid function. Buyers are assumed to have 
homogenous preferences for the item being sold in the auction.  
For the agent-based model results, we report the unconditional expected revenue. 
The buyers expected revenues are calculated with numerical integration. Buyer i’s 














)(][  (1.6) 
where BiR is the expected revenue for the buyer i, },1max{ jj bxb  , and X is the retail 
value of the item being sold, which is assigned to be 0.5. Buyers are bid-shading when 
their equilibrium bid price is less than 0.5, and the winner’s curse outcome is present if 
the equilibrium bid price is greater than 0.5.  
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Sellers are assumed to be homogeneous and price-takers; therefore, this agent-
based auction model can be viewed as containing one representative seller or a set of 
sellers who share information. When the seller imposes a reserve price ]1,1[ r , the 
buyers expected revenue function changes. The seller’s reserve price is not stochastic, 
and their true value for the item is zero, so the seller is expected to accept any bid greater 
than or equal to zero. To win the item, buyers must not only bid higher than the other 
buyer, but their bid price must be greater than or equal to the seller’s reserve price. This 
restriction changes the lower bound of the expected revenue integral to the seller’s 










   )(][  (1.7) 
where },1max{ rxx i  , },max{ jbrb  , and r is the seller’s reserve price.  











]],|[[][  (1.8) 
where SR  is the expected revenue for the representative seller. Then, we modify the 
above model by letting the error terms in buyer i’s bid function be distributed ]1,0[~ Ui , 
while buyer j’s bid function is distributed )12/1,2/1(~ Nj . Chen and Wang (2011) 
encourage future research to investigate artificial auction equilibrium when agents are 
programmed with differences in their learning abilities. Not all humans or firms 
participating in auctions are equal in many respects; thus, making agents non-symmetric 
might be more realistic to actual auctions and human experiments (Chen and Wang 
2011). In addition to Chen and Wang’s (2011) suggestions, Casari, Ham, and Kagel’s 
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(2007) experiment found that intelligence, demographics, and other characteristics 
influence bid price in a common-value auction, which also suggests agents with non-
symmetric bid functions might be interesting to investigate. Allowing the buyers to have 
different distributional assumptions for their bid function is possible in an agent-based 
auction, which illustrates a major advantage of using the agent-based technique. Finally, 
we return the buyers’ information signals to be distributed ]1,0[U  and include a third 
buyer in the auction. Results are presented for the oligopsony artificial auction model 
with and without the reserve price.  
 
Numerical Integration 
To solve the expected revenue functions, numerical integration techniques are used. 
Recently, some attention has been given in the literature to developing new methods to 
numerically solve simulated auction problems (Gayle and Richard 2008; Peng and Yang 
2010; Fibich and Gavish 2011), but they are not easily adaptable to agent-based auctions. 
We combine the trapezoidal rule and Gaussian quadrature with the PSO learning 
algorithm developed by Zhang and Brorsen (2009). The trapezoidal rule is used to 
approximate the integral when both buyers have uniformly distributed
1
 error terms, and 
Gaussian quadrature points and weights are used to estimate the integral when the errors 
in the buyers’ bid function are normally distributed. Combining the trapezoidal rule and 
Gaussian quadrature with the PSO algorithm to solve an agent-based common-value 
auction is a unique contribution to the agent-based model literature. 
                                                          
1
 While more efficient integration algorithms exist in the case of all buyers having a uniform distribution 
(for example, we have verified the algorithm by solving the integral analytically in the duopsony case), we 
use the trapezoidal rule in all cases to be consistent with methods used on more complex problems. 
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When the buyer’s error term is distributed uniformly, we use the trapezoidal rule 
to approximate expected revenues. When the integral is “rough” or not twice 
differentiable, the trapezoidal rule is better for approximating integrals than Simpson’s 
rule (Cruz-Uribe and Neugebauer 2002). Expected revenue can be truncated at the 
reserve price, which makes the trapezoidal rule a more appropriate integration method 
than Simpson’s rule. This method estimates the area of trapezoids for n subintervals or 
lengths to determine the expected revenues for each buyer. The trapezoidal rule is 










)( 110   (1.9) 
where ∆x = (b-a)/n, f(x) is the probability density function of winning the item, nyy ,...,0  
are the grid points in the integral, b is the upper bound of the integral, and a is the lower 
bound of the integral. The probability weights at each point of the integral are x except 
at the tails where the probability weight is 2x . With the uniform distribution, n is 
assigned to be 100, resulting in a ∆x of 1/100 and a distance of 1/100 between points in 
the integral. Pseudo code is provided in Table I-1 that outlines the programs used to 
approximate expected revenues.  
 Extending Kagel and Levin’s (1986) model, we allow the error term for one of the 
buyers to be normally distributed, and Gaussian quadrature is used to approximate the 
expected revenue integral. Gaussian quadrature gives a set or probability weights and 
points that can approximate a continuous distribution that matches 2k-1 moments 
(Preckel and DeVuyst 1992). Preckel and DeVuyst (1992) provide a clear explanation of 
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how to solve for the probability weights and points to approximate an integral for various 











)()(  (1.10) 
where f(x) is the continuous probability density function, p
j
 is the ith probability weight, 
x
j
 is the jth point, k is the number of quadrature points, and 12,...,0  kl  is the number 
of equations. In the agent-based auction, we set k=9 and follow Preckel and DeVuyst’s 
(1992) steps to find the probability weights and points for )12/1,2/1(~ N . The mean 
and variance for this distribution are chosen to match the mean and variance of the 
uniform distribution. Expected revenues are approximated using a similar approach to 
that described in Table I-1. 
 
Particle Swarm Optimization 
Multiple learning algorithms such as genetic algorithms and reinforcement learning 
algorithms are frequently used in agent-based models, but we use the PSO learning 
algorithm developed by Eberhart and Kennedy (1995) and modified by Zhang and 
Brorsen (2009). This algorithm solves faster than the genetic algorithm (Zhang and 
Brorsen 2009) and was successfully implemented by Zhang and Brorsen (2010). Zhang 
and Brorsen (2009) let each agent have its own “flock of birds” or clones by constructing 
Kk ,...,1 parallel auctions for each agent. Each agent has k clones that act in the k 
parallel auctions and use the clone’s bid strategies in the k auctions to help the agent find 
its optimal strategy. The agent’s best bid strategy across all parallel auctions is referred to 
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as the best global solution, and the agent’s best bid strategy in each parallel auction is 
referred to as the best local solution.  
The ith agent has a choice variable (bid price or reserve price) tkix ,,  in parallel 
auction k during iteration Tt ,...,1 , and an adjustment velocity ]1,1[,, tkiv  that directs 
the agent’s choice variable. The velocity change for agent i is a function of the local best 
solutions,
l
tkip ,,  , where superscript l indicates the best solution in the local auction, and 
the agent’s global best solution,
g
tip ,  , where superscript g indicates the best global 
solution. In iteration t, the ith agent’s new choice variable in parallel auction k is updated 






tkitkitki xpuqxpuqwvv    (1.11) 
where w is the inertia weight factor, u1 and u2 are uniformly distributed random numbers, 
and q1 and q2 are learning parameters. The learning parameters are 
   TtTqq qqtt /11 10,2,1   , (1.12) 
where both 10
q and 11
q are constants, which are set at one in this model, T is the 
maximum number of iterations, and t is the current iteration. When selecting a parameter 
value for inertia weight, an important tradeoff occurs between exploration and 
convergence time (Chatterjee and Siarry 2006). A large inertia weight slows convergence 
time, but encourages agents to explore a larger area, and a small inertia weight increases 
convergence time, but reduces the agents’ exploration area (Zhang and Brorsen 2009). 
Zhang and Brorsen (2009) develop a compromise for this tradeoff by letting w start high 
and decrease as the optimization proceeds. Inertia weight as expressed in Zhang and 
Brorsen (2009) is  
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1 are constants. We set these constants to be 0.75.  
Since agents’ revenues depend on the other agents’ choice variables, the agent’s 
previous best strategy possibly may not perform well in the next iteration. Therefore, the 
PSO learning algorithm recalculates revenues for each buyer from the previous L best 
local solutions based on the other agents’ new choice variable in iteration t. The best local 
strategy is expressed as  
 
 tkijtkikl Ltkikl tkikl tki xxRpRpRp ,,,,,,1,,,, )(),(),...,(maxarg  , (1.14)  
where kR is the revenue in parallel market k. Other agents’ strategies in the current 
iteration are held constant, and the past best locals of each agent in L iterations are 
reevaluated. The bid strategy with the highest revenue is selected as the best local bid 
strategy. The best global choice variable is selected from the best local parameters and is 
expressed as  
 
 )(,),(),(maxarg ,,2,,21,,1, l tKiKl til tigti pRpRpRp   (1.15) 
where K is the total number of parallel markets. The PSO learning algorithm is discussed 
in further detail in Zhang and Brorsen (2009).  
Changes in the agent’s strategies become smaller as the algorithm begins to find 
the buyers’ and the seller’s optimal choice variables. The equilibrium bid prices and 
reserve price are determined when the total change in the previous 10 bid prices for the 
buyers and the previous 10 reserve prices for the seller is less than 0.0000001, and the 
total change in the standard deviations of the reserve price and bid prices are less than 
0.00000001. The PSO parameter values are in Table I-2. The model is set to have 100 
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evolutions (E=100), and each evolution has a maximum of 500 iterations (T=500). This 
configuration means the agents have up to 500 iterations in each evolution to converge to 
equilibrium, and the model repeats this process 100 times. The results presented in the 
paper are the averages and standard deviations over the 100 evolutions.  
Figure I-1 summarizes the discussion about the general process of the agent-based 
auction without a reserve price. The figure shows the connection across the agents, the 
numerical integration, and the PSO algorithm. Following the arrows in the figure, agents 
first choose a bid strategy to enter the auction. Numerical integration is used to 
approximate the probability of winning the item in the auction with their current bid 
strategy. The expected revenues, probability of winning, and winning bid price are stored. 
Finally, the agents’ bid strategies are tested to determine if the equilibrium criteria has 
been met. If it has not been met, then the PSO learning algorithm directs the agents to 
new bid strategies, and if it has been met, then the model progresses to the next evolution.  
 
Results 
Duopsony Artificial Auction  
When no reserve price is imposed and the buyer’s information signal is 
distributed ]1,0[U , the average equilibrium winning bid is -0.21, which indicates that 
buyers are bid-shading, and avoiding the winner’s curse (Table I-3). In human 
experiments, the winner’s curse approaches zero as buyers gain experience (Kagel and 
Levin 2002). Evaluation of the agents’ previous best global and local bid strategies is 
similar to increasing the buyers’ experiences in a human experiment, which explains why 
the winner’s curse is avoided in the artificial auction. The average bid price across all 
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winning and losing bid prices for buyer one is -0.37, and buyer two’s average bid price is 
-0.41 (Table I-3). The difference between the buyers’ average bid prices is due to noise 
since the buyers are identical. Buyer one has a higher bid price on average than buyer 
two, resulting in buyer one having a higher probability of winning the item and a higher 
expected revenue per item. Table I-3 presents the expected revenue per item received 
over all the buyers’ winning and losing bids. Buyer one’s expected revenue per item is 
0.37, and buyer two’s expected revenue per item is 0.33. For the duopsony auction, Kagel 
and Levin’s (1986) model predicts the conditional expected revenue for the winning 
buyer is one-third, which is different from the buyers’ conditional expected revenues in 
the agent-based model of 0.70. As discussed above, Kagel and Levin (1986) constrained 
their agents’ bids and they ended up with a corner solution. Their constraint would 
impose that buyers bid at least zero on average. The seller’s expected revenue per item is 
-0.21, but the seller’s expected revenue per item could be made positive by adding a 
constant to the value of the item or a positive random value as in Kagel and Levin (1986). 
These results do suggest that buyers have market power in this artificial auction and are 
able to shade bids below the item’s true value.  
 When a reserve price is imposed by the seller in the artificial auction, the average 
equilibrium winning bid is 0.22 (Table I-3), which is an increase of 0.43 from when no 
reserve price is imposed. This result matches the Levin and Smith (1996) theoretical 
findings, and the experimental results of Goncalves (2009) and Reiley (2006). McAfee 
and McMillan (1987) argue that setting a reserve price is an effective counter to bid-
shading, and the average equilibrium winning bid price in the artificial auction illustrates 
this same result. The seller’s optimal reserve price in the agent-based auction is zero, 
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which is the seller’s true value and matches Levin and Smith’s (1996) prediction of 
seller’s optimal reserve prices (Table I-3). The buyers’ expected revenues per item for all 
winning and losing bid prices decrease, and the seller’s expected revenue per item 
increases to 0.13 when a reserve price is present (Table I-3). Theoretical (Riley and 
Samuelson 1981; Leven and Smith 1996) and experimental (Reiley 2006; Goncalves 
2009) results have shown that a reserve price can increase the seller’s revenue. The 
probability the item is sold decreases to 61% of the possible transactions when the 
optimal reserve price is imposed (Table I-3). Goncalves (2009) and Reiley (2006) 
experiments find a reserve price reduces the probability of a transaction, which indicates 
a reserve price can be a barrier to entry for buyers.  
Relaxing Kagel and Levin’s (1986) assumption of symmetric bid distributions, 
buyer one’s bid function is changed to be distributed )12/1,2/1(N , and buyer two’s bid 
function is distributed ]1,0[U . The mean and variance of the two distributions are equal, 
but the buyers’ bid functions are non-symmetric. The seller still selects the optimal 
reserve price of zero in this artificial auction, and the average equilibrium winning bid 
price is 0.21, which is slightly less than the average equilibrium winning bid price when 
the buyers’ bid functions are symmetric (Table I-3). Buyer one has a lower probability of 
winning in spite of having a higher average bid price than buyer two (Table I-3). As a 
result, buyer two has a larger expected revenue than buyer one (Table I-3). The normally 
distributed information is not as valuable as the uniformly distributed information. The 
probability of the item being sold decreases to 56%, resulting in the seller’s expected 
revenue decreasing to 0.11 per item (Table I-3). Results for the agent-based auction with 
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non-symmetric buyers are slightly different than when buyers are symmetric, and this 
fact might be of interest to develop further in future research.  
 
Oligopsony Artificial Auction  
With three buyers and no reserve price, the average equilibrium winning bid is 0.08 
(Table I-4). An additional buyer participating in the artificial auction increases the 
average winning bid price by 0.29 from the duopsony auction with no reserve price, 
which matches results in empirical studies (Meyer 1988) and field experiments 
(Goncalves 2009). In empirical work on rice auctions, Meyer (1988) finds prices 
increased as the number of bidders increased and argues that it is evidence in favor of the 
winners curse, yet our results suggest such a finding could be due to increased 
competition. Bulow and Klemperer (1996) argue that in a private value English auction, 
an additional buyer will increase the bid price more than a reserve price with one less 
buyer. Conversely, Goncalves (2009) found that including an additional buyer in the 
second-price common-value auction does not increase the equilibrium bid price as much 
as a reserve price, which matches our agent-based model results. The buyers’ expected 
revenues per item decrease and the seller’s expected revenue per item increase from the 
artificial duopsony auction with no reserve price (Table I-4). Since the seller does not 
have the choice to not sell the item under this scenario, the probability of selling the item 
is 100% (Table I-4). 
 When a reserve price is imposed by the seller in the oligopsony artificial auction, 
the average equilibrium winning bid price is 0.27 (Table I-4), which is an increase of 0.19 
from when no reserve price is present in the oligopsony auction. This result matches both 
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the theory (Levin and Smith 1996; Rosenkranz and Schmitz 2007) and field experiments 
in the literature (Reiley 2006; Goncalves 2009) and results from the duopsony artificial 
auction when a reserve price is imposed. The winning bid price for the oligopsony 
auction increases by 0.05 compared to the duopsony auction with a reserve price. The 
increased competition from an additional buyer increases the winning bid price even 
when the seller imposes a reserve price. The seller’s optimal reserve price is 0.01 (Table 
I-4). This price is slightly higher than the seller’s true value of the item being sold, but is 
likely due to rounding or randomness in the optimization algorithm. The buyers expected 
revenues per item decrease from when no reserve price is imposed to 0.06 (Table I-4). 
The seller’s expected revenue increases to 0.20 per item, and the probability of selling the 
item is 77%. This figure is an increase of 16% from the duopsony auction with a reserve 
price, and it is due to the increase in competition from the third buyer. Similar to the 
duopsony artificial auction and Reiley (2006), the reserve price appears to be a barrier for 
some buyers to participate in the auction. The reserve price has similar effects when an 
additional buyer participates in the auction, matching the findings in the literature (Levin 
and Smith 1996; Reiley 2006; Goncalves 2009).  
 
Convergence Time for the Artificial Auctions 
Table I-5 summarizes the convergence time and the number of iterations before meeting 
the convergence criteria in the agent-based duopsony and oligopsony auctions. This 
information is dependent on several factors (such as computer, compiler, and other 
factors) but is intended to show how the modeling changes affect convergence. The 
computer used has an Intel® Core
TM
 i7-2600 processor, and the models are programmed 
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in Java using Eclipse. When no reserve price is set by the seller in the duopsony auction, 
the agents require on average 91.2 iterations before meeting the equilibrium criteria. Each 
evolution takes on average 1.67 seconds to converge, resulting in a total solving time of a 
little less than three minutes (Table I-5). When a reserve price is chosen by the seller in 
the duopsony auction, the model requires on average 101.6 iterations per evolution to 
converge with each evolution taking on average is 1.98 seconds per evolution or roughly 
three minutes (Table I-5). The seller’s choice variable of their reserve price did not 
substantially slow convergence. When the buyers’ bid functions are uniform and normal, 
the agent-based duopsony auction requires on average 102.8 iterations per evolution to 
converge, with each evolution taking an average of 0.25 seconds or a total solving time of 
roughly 30 seconds (Table I-5). Gaussian quadrature requires fewer points to 
approximate the integral than the trapezoidal rule, which causes the model to converge 
faster.  
The figures displayed show an example of an evolution for each auction structure. 
Figure I-2 shows the path to convergence for the winning bid price in the duopsony 
auction, and Figure I-3 displays the buyers’ and the seller’s revenues in the duopsony 
auction. The figures show the agents explored several alternative strategies briefly, but 
roughly the last two-thirds of the iterations cause only minor refinements in the solution. 
Figure I-4 shows the convergence paths of the winning bid price and reserve price in the 
duopsony auction. The figure shows the seller’s reserve price and the winning bid price 
move fairly closely. The expected revenue for the buyers and the seller in the duopsony 
auction is shown in Figure I-5. Similarly to when no reserve price is imposed, the buyers’ 
and the seller’s revenues change as the buyers and seller explore alternative bid and 
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reserve price strategies. Figure I-6 displays the convergence path of the winning bid price 
and the reserve price in the duopsony auction, and Figure I-7 shows the convergence path 
of the seller’s and buyers’ expected revenues in the duopsony auction. An advantage of 
Gaussian quadrature over the trapezoidal rule is it requires fewer points to approximate 
an integral. These larger jumps in the numerical integration do not appear to cause the 
agents’ to dramatically change their bid strategies.  
For the oligopsony auction when no reserve price is imposed, the agents require 
98.6 iterations on average before meeting the equilibrium criteria (Table I-5). Each 
evolution takes roughly 10 minutes to converge for a total solving time of approximately 
16 hours (Table 5). When a reserve price is imposed in the oligopsony auction, the model 
requires on average 101.8 iterations per evolution to converge with each evolution taking 
on average a little over 10 minutes for a total solving time of roughly 17 hours (Table I-
5). Similar to the duopsony auction structure, the time to converge for the model is 
slightly slower when seller imposes a reserve price. The oligopsony auction structure 
takes on average much more time to converge than the duopsony auction structure.  
 
Conclusions 
The objective of this paper is to determine the implications of a reserve price in a first-
price common-value auction. Considerable theoretical and empirical work has focused on 
the influence of reserve prices in an independent private values auction, but little 
attention has been given to a first-price common-value auction. Duopsony and 
oligopsony agent-based auctions are established to find the optimal reserve price and the 
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equilibrium winning bid price and the implications of a reserve price on the auction 
equilibrium. An agent-based auction is used to solve this problem.  
 Finding the analytical solution to common-value auctions is difficult, and when a 
reserve price is included in this auction, is perhaps infeasible. Reproducing this auction in 
a laboratory experiment would be expensive. Thus, using an agent-based auction model is 
an appropriate method to determine the implications of a reserve price in a first-price 
common-value auction. In addition, an agent-based first-price common-value auction 
with a reserve price has never been solved in the literature, making this model a unique 
contribution to the agent-based literature. Furthermore, we extend the agent-based model 
literature by introducing a combination of numerical integration techniques with the 
particle swarm algorithm. Finally, we address Chen and Wang’s (2011) suggestion of 
considering non-symmetric agents by allowing the buyers’ signals to have different 
distributions.  
In the two buyer auction, buyers shade bids when a reserve price is not imposed 
by the seller. The equilibrium winning bid price increases when a reserve price is 
imposed, resulting in the seller’s expected revenue increasing, and the buyers’ expected 
revenues decreasing. Furthermore, differences in expected revenues are found in the 
duopsony auction when the buyers are non-symmetric, but the winning bid price remains 
similar to when buyers are symmetric. This finding might be interesting to explore further 
in future research. When a third buyer is introduced in the auction with no reserve price, 
the equilibrium winning bid price increases relative to the duopsony artificial auction 
with no reserve price. The increase in competition from an additional buyer is effective at 
increasing the winning bid price, but not as effective as a reserve price in a duopsony 
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auction. When a reserve price is imposed by the seller in the oligopsony artificial auction, 
the equilibrium bid price increases relative to when no reserve price is present. A reserve 
price in the duopsony and oligopsony auctions is effective in increasing the average 
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Table I-1. Pseudo Code for the Duopsony with Symmetric Buyers 
    
1 Begin outside loop where error term ε1 is equal to zero and 
increases by 1/100 until ε1 equals 1 
2  If ε1 equals 0 or 1 then the probability weight W1 is 1/200 
3  Else the probability weight W1 is 1/100 
4  Set buyer 1’s random bid price equal to buyer 1’s choice 
variable x1 minus the value for ε1 
5  Set buyer 2’s random bid price equal to buyer 2’s choice 
variable x2 minus the value for ε1 
6  Set probability buyer 1 wins P1 equal to zero. 
7  Set probability buyer 2 wins P2 equal to zero. 
8    
9  Begin inside loop where error term ε2 is equal to zero and 
increases by 1/100 until ε2 equals 1 
10   If ε2 equals 0 or 1 then probability weight W2 is 
1/200 
11   Else the probability W2 is 1/100 
12   Set buyer 1’s temporary random bid price equal to 
buyer 1’s choice variable x1 minus the value for ε2 
13   Set buyer 2’s temporary random bid price equal to 
buyer 2’s choice variable x2 minus the value for ε2 
14   If random bid price for buyer 1 is greater than 
temporary random bid price for buyer 2 then 
probability of winning for buyer 1 P1 increases by W2 
15   If random bid price for buyer 2 is greater than 
temporary random bid price for buyer 1 then 
probability of winning for buyer 2 P2 increases by W2 
16  End of the inside loop 
17    
18  Buyer 1’s revenue is calculated by multiplying W1 by the 
buyer 1’s probability of winning P1 times the difference 
between the retail price and the chosen random bid price, 
and summed over all random bid prices 
19  Buyer 2’s revenue is calculated by multiplying W1 by buyer 
2’s probability of winning P2 times the difference between 
the retail price and the chosen random bid price, and 
summed over all random bid prices 
20  Seller revenue is calculated by multiplying W1 by summing 
buyer 1’s random bid price multiplied by probability of 
buyer 1 winning P1 plus buyer 2’s random bid price 
multiplied by probability of buyer 2 winning P2, and summed 
over all random bid prices 
21   
22 End of outside loop 
23    
24 Winning bid price is calculated by dividing the sellers profits by 







Table I-2. Parameter Values for the Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm 
Parameter Symbol Value 
Intercept of inertia weight w
0  0.75 
Slope of inertia weight w
1  0.75 
Learning parameters intercept q
0  0.75 
Learning parameter slope q
1  0.75 
Parallel markets k 10 
Maximum iterations T 500 
Evolutions E 100 





Table I-3. Equilibrium Values for the Agent-Based Duopsony Auctions 
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Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
a
 All results, except average winning bid price, are unconditional on winning.  
b
 Both errors are distributed U[0,1]. 
c





Table I-4. Equilibrium Values for the Agent-Based Oligopsony Auctions 
  Scenario 
Category
a
 No Reserve Price Reserve Price 





Reserve price - 
0.01 
(0.13) 
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Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses, and buyers’ errors are distributed U[0,1]. 
a






Table I-5. Time and Number of Iterations to Converge per Evolution for the 
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Figure I-2. Example Evolution for the Winning Bid Price with no Reserve Price 






Figure I-3. Example Evolution for Revenues in the Agent-Based Duopsony 






Figure I-4. Example Evolution for the Winning Bid Price and Reserve Price in 






Figure I-5. Example Evolution for the Revenues in the Agent-Based Duopsony 





Figure I-6. Example Evolution for the Winning Bid Price and Reserve Price with 






Figure I-7. Example Evolution for the Revenues in the Agent-Based Duopsony 














CHANGES IN MARKET POWER FROM THE LIVESTOCK  
MANDATORY PRICE REPORTING ACT: AN  
AGENT-BASED AUCTION APPROACH 
Introduction 
In 1999, the U.S. Congress passed the Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act (MPR) 
to improve transparency in livestock markets by publicly reporting transaction data that 
includes average prices paid between meat packers and producers. This legislation was 
passed in response to concerns that the heavy concentration of meat packing firms gives 
packers market power (Koontz and Ward 2011). The act requires meat packers that 
annually slaughter 125,000 cattle, 100,000 swine, or 75,000 lambs to report daily 
transactions to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Marketing Service 
(USDA-AMS). The USDA-AMS reports summaries for the entire industry and for five 
regional U.S. markets. Prior to this legislation, meat packers voluntarily reported 
transactions to the USDA-AMS, and the agency produced publicly available reports 
summarizing the voluntary data. By requiring meat packers to report transactions, more 
information is available to producers and meat packers. A sunset provision was written 
into the MPR legislation with an expiration date of September 2005, and the act was 
renewed through 2010. Recently, this legislation was renewed again through 2015; 
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creating new debate and interest about the effects of MPR (see USDOJ-USDA 2010). 
With the legislation having another sunset provision and many questions remaining 
unanswered, more research is needed into the effects of MPR in cattle markets (Koontz 
and Ward 2011).  
 In an early article about MPR, Wachenheim and DeVuyst (2001) express 
concerns that packers could use information in USDA-AMS reports created from MPR to 
act strategically and exercise market power at the expense of producers. Their concerns 
are not based on a formal model but on empirical observation from industries that use 
posted prices such as the railroad industry (Fuller, Ruppel, and Bessler 1990) and long 
distance telephone service (MacAvoy 1995). . Azzam (2003) provides the first theoretical 
model to study the implications of MPR. His model follows a Cournot framework and 
finds the USDA-AMS reports may be of little value to producers, but might increase 
competition among packers. Overall, Azzam (2003) concludes MPR should increase 
competition among meat packers, which would cause the prices paid by packers to 
increase and the variance of reported prices to decrease. Njoroge (2003) modifies 
Azzam’s (2003) model by assuming meat packers have asymmetric prior distributions of 
livestock prices, and finds that MPR can promote collusion among meat packers. Koontz 
and Ward (2011) argue that for cattle markets, the assumption of asymmetric prior 
distributions is less realistic than Azzam’s (2003) assumption of symmetric priors. 
Koontz and Ward (2011) explain that large meat packers buy and process cattle in many 
different regional markets, which provide them with mostly symmetric information about 
prices. Njoroge et al. (2007) extend Njoroge (2003) by measuring welfare effects before 
and after MPR with a Cournot model. Depending on the value of the social benefits and 
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costs, they find that MPR might benefit society, even though MPR can increase packers’ 
market power. Furthermore, Azzam and Salvador (2004) use a theoretical model with 
risk-averse Cournot firms to measure the change in packers’ market power after MPR 
was passed, and they find that in all five regions MPR would not increase packers’ 
market power. In summary, the results from previous theoretical models do not agree, 
and questions exist about the appropriateness of the Cournot assumption for livestock 
markets.  
The theoretical models in the MPR literature that measure market power in cattle 
markets use a Cournot framework, which assumes packers make production decisions 
based on quantity (Azzam 2003; Azzam and Salvador 2004; Njoroge 2003; Njoroge et al. 
2007). However, cattle are purchased by packers in the U.S. where packers mostly 
choose a price for cattle, which is a Bertrand framework. Theory shows in aggregate 
models that the Cournot solution can find market power, while the Bertrand solution is 
the competitive solution (Varian 1992). Zhang and Brorsen (2010) conclude that the 
Cournot model predicts more market power than is observed in actual cattle markets 
(Crespi, Xia, and Jones 2010; Ward 2002) and argue that an alternative approach is 
needed. In our review of the literature, an auction model has never been used to 
determine the changes in packers’ market power due to MPR, and this approach is closer 
to the way cattle are actually purchased than the Cournot models.  
Theoretical auction models (Milgrom and Weber 1982) and experimental human 
auctions (Corrigan and Rousu 2011; Kagel and Levin 1986) have found that revealing 
information to buyers can increase the equilibrium price, but do not consider how 
providing information to sellers affects the equilibrium price. Anderson et al. (1998) use 
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experimental data from the Packer-Feeder game, and find that an increase in public 
information to packers increases the market price and decreases price variability. The 
Anderson et al. (1998) paper is informative in understanding the effects of MPR in fed 
cattle auctions, but does not exactly match an auction situation and is empirical rather 
than theoretical. The human experiments suggest that MPR can reduce market power and 
increase prices paid by packers in auctions, which conflicts with the theoretical Cournot 
models of Njoroge (2003) and Njoroge et al. (2007). Recent econometric work with 
actual cattle transaction data by Cai, Stiegert, and Koontz (2011) finds that packers’ 
market power increased after the introduction of MPR; however, factors other than MPR 
could be the cause of increasing market power. These inconsistencies in the theoretical 
models, human experiments, and econometric work warrant Koontz and Ward’s (2011) 
call for further investigation into the changes in beef packers’ market power after MPR.  
 Experimental auctions can be useful to study the changes in market power before 
and after MPR (Anderson et al. 1998; Carlberg, Hogan, and Ward 2009), but controlled 
human experiments can be expensive, and they usually provide little understanding of the 
agents’ motivations. Furthermore, theoretical auction models with sufficient detail to 
closely match cattle markets are perhaps intractable to solve analytically. Agent-based 
computational modeling is becoming a complementary technique to human experiments 
and theoretical models (Alkemade, La Poutré, and Amman 2006; Arifovic 1996; 
Bonabeua 2002), and has successfully been used to model auctions (Guerci, Stefano, and 
Cincotti 2008; Hailu and Thoyer 2010; Tesfatsion 2001). In these models, artificial 
markets are created that allow buying and selling agents to trade until an equilibrium 
criterion is reached (Tesfatsion 2001). In agricultural economics, agent-based models 
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have mostly been used to study land use (Balmann 1997; Berger 2001), but were used by 
Zhang and Brorsen (2010) with a Cournot model of the cattle procurement industry, and 
by Graubner, Balmann, and Sexton (2011) to address spatial price discrimination by 
processors of agricultural commodities.  
 We develop an agent-based, first-price common-value auction model to determine 
the effects of reducing the uncertainty of buyers and sellers. The objective is to provide a 
different theoretical approach to understanding the change in packers’ market power 
before and after implementing MPR. In the auction model, buyers choose a bid price, and 
sellers choose a reserve price, which is a more realistic model of actual cattle 
procurement than the Cournot models. Common-value auction solutions are difficult to 
obtain analytically (Gordy 1998) and including a reserve price might make it infeasible to 
solve, which makes an agent-based model appropriate. Simulated buyers and sellers use 
Zhang and Brorsen’s (2009) particle swarm optimization (PSO) learning algorithm 
combined with numerical integration to find their optimal bid and reserve price strategies. 
In our model both buyers and sellers are uncertain about cattle value. The effects of MPR 
are modeled by reducing this uncertainty. This research is a contribution to the MPR 
theoretical literature, and determining the effects of a noisy reserve price signal on 
equilibrium is also a contribution to the auction literature.  
   
Auction Theory 
Even though fed cattle are mostly purchased by private treaty rather than a formal 
auction, auction models are commonly used to model cattle sales. Auctions are normally 
classified as common value, private value, or affiliated value (Krishna 2002; Milgrom 
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and Weber 1982). If the value of the item being sold is equal for all buyers or the resale 
value of the item is the same for all buyers, then the auction is considered a common 
value auction (Kagel and Levin 2002). In a private value auction, a buyer’s bid price for 
the item is determined by the buyer’s unique private value for the item such as an art 
auction (Paarsch 1992). The affiliated value auction is a more universal case where the 
resale value of the item is similar for all buyers, but value differs across buyers (Pinkse 
and Tan 2005). In reality, auctions rarely exactly match one of these three types of 
auctions, and are more likely a hybrid of these auction types (Corrigan and Rousu 2011). 
Cattle sales do not exactly match any type of auction. Crespi and Sexton (2004) 
state cattle sales are an example of a hybrid auction type, but argue that cattle probably 
have affiliated values among buyers. Chung and Tostão (2009) and Tostão, Chung, and 
Brorsen (2011) use an independent private values auction model to estimate the 
equilibrium bid price for an experimental fed cattle auction. They admit the private 
values assumption is too restrictive for cattle, but follow it because common value and 
affiliated value auctions have econometric identification problems. However, wholesale 
beef prices received by packers are similar enough across packers to assume common 
value auction theory is appropriate to model cattle auctions.  
We establish an agent-based first-price common value auction model similar to 
Kagel and Levin’s (1986) analytical model, but allow sellers to impose a reserve price (or 
minimum bid price). We choose the first-price auction with a reserve price because it 
most closely resembles actual fed cattle sales (Crespi and Sexton 2004; 2005). Beef 
packing is highly concentrated with a few large packers (Ward 2002; 2010), which is 
why we choose to model the auction with two buyers. This auction structure allows 
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buyers to exercise market power on sellers by shading bids below the market value 
(Klemperer 1999; Robinson 1985), and also lets us determine if market power decreases 
by reducing the buyers’ or sellers’ uncertainty of the item’s value. In the last decade, 
packers have increased their use of alternative marketing agreements to purchase cattle, 
and have relied less on cash markets (Ward 2009a; 2009b; 2010). Cash market purchases 
of cattle by packers, however, remain a considerable portion of packers’ cattle 
procurement (Crespi and Sexton 2004; Ward 2009a; 2009b), and formula prices are often 
based on cash prices.  
 In the agent-based auction, buyers with homogeneous preferences submit bids on 
an item based on their noisy information signal. The bid function used follows Kagel and 
Levin (1986) and matches Andreoni and Miller’s (1995) proposed common value bid 
function for an agent-based auction, and is   
 iii xb   (2.1) 
 where bi is the bid price for buyer i=1, 2, ]1,1[ ix  is the choice variable for buyer i, 
]1,0[~ Ui  jiji  0),cov(  is the noisy signal buyer i receives about the value of 
the item.  
Sellers are assumed to be homogeneous, price-takers, and non-competitive so one 
representative seller is included in the model. The seller imposes a reserve price 
 mr , where ]1,1[ m is the seller’s choice variable and ]1,0[~ U  is the seller’s 
noisy signal, which is independent of buyers’ signals. This model provides a unique 
contribution to the auction literature since the effect of a noisy reserve price on the 
equilibrium bid price in an auction has not received much attention (Reiley 2006). Buyers 
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must bid higher than the other buyers and greater than the seller’s reserve price to win the 
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  (2.2) 
where BR1 is the expected revenue for buyer one, X is the buyers’ retail value of the item 
being sold, r is the reserve price chosen by the seller, }1,max{ 2  xrb , and 
}1,max{ 1  xbx . The buyers’ retail value in the agent-based auction is X=0.5. Agent-
based buyers do not retain the true value of the item so it is not necessary to randomly 
generate a new true value for the item in each repeated auction as in Kagel and Levin 
(1986). Buyers are bid-shading when the average winning bid price is less than 0.5, and 
the winner’s curse outcome is present if the average winning bid price is greater than 0.5.  
  When all bid prices are less than the seller’s reserve price then the seller does not 
sell the item. The seller’s expected revenue is the sum of each buyer’s expected winning 
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where SR is the expected revenue for the representative seller and Pi is the probability 
buyer i wins the item.  
The model is also set up with asymmetric buyers following Njoroge’s (2003) 
assumption. In the asymmetric model, buyer one’s noisy signal is changed to be 
distributed ]2/1,0[U , which reduces buyer one’s uncertainty to be less than that of the 
seller and buyer two. The change in mean of the uniform distribution does not matter 
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since we report average of the bid price (bi) rather than the average of the choice variable 
(xi).  
For the agent-based auction after MPR, price information provided by MPR is 
assumed to reduce the noisy signal for buyers and the seller. Therefore, the agent-based 
common value auction model is modified to represent a cattle auction after MPR by 
reducing the uncertainty to be ]2/1,0[U . Results are presented for several market 
scenarios. We reduce the seller’s noisy signal while the buyers’ noisy signal remains 
distributed ]1,0[U , which represents MPR reducing only the seller’s uncertainty. 
Conversely, we reduce the buyers’ noisy signal while the seller’s noisy signal is not 
reduced, which represents MPR reducing only buyers’ uncertainty. Finally, we reduce 
both the seller’s and the buyers’ noisy signal, which represents MPR reducing both buyer 
and seller uncertainty in cattle auctions. The winning equilibrium bid price, expected 
revenues, and the probability the item is sold are presented for each scenario. 
This paper extends the auction literature by showing the effects of providing 
sellers with information or reducing their uncertainty. Milgrom and Weber (1982) show 
theoretically that revealing public information to buyers in an auction increases 
competition between buyers, and can likely increase the equilibrium bid price. Also, 
Kagel and Levin (1986) found releasing public information to the buyers in a common 
value auction increases the sellers’ revenue in a human experiment. Our model differs 
from the models in these papers because we allow the seller to impose a reserve price, 
and the seller receives a noisy signal about the value of the item. Our results show how 
providing the seller with information changes the equilibrium, which Milgrom and Weber 




Figure II-1 summarizes the general process of the agent-based auction with a reserve 
price. First, the buyers and the seller randomly choose a bid and reserve price strategy. 
The choice variables are x1, x2, and m. Numerical integration is used to calculate the 
agents’ expected revenues, average bid prices, average reserve price, winning bid price, 
and the probability of winning for each buying and selling agent. At the end of each 
iteration, the convergence criterion for equilibrium is tested. If the convergence criterion 
is not met, then the particle swarm optimization (PSO) learning algorithm directs the 
agents to improved strategies for the next iteration. If the convergence criterion is met, 
then the model progresses to the next run. We combine numerical integration with the 
PSO learning algorithm to solve an agent-based auction when the agents have a noisy 
signal. Combining numerical integration with the PSO learning algorithm is an extension 
of the agent-based model literature. 
 
Numerical Integration 
Numerical integration is used to approximate the buying and selling agents’ expected 
revenues. Recently, new methods have been developed to numerically solve simulated 
auction problems (Fibich and Gavish 2011; Gayle and Richard 2008; Peng and Yang 
2010), but they are not easily adaptable to agent-based auctions. The trapezoidal rule is 
used to approximate the expected revenue integrals. Other integration algorithms such as 
Gaussian quadrature (Preckel and DeVuyst 1992) could be used to approximate these 
integrals, but we choose the trapezoidal rule because it is straightforward to program and 
efficient enough for the problem being considered.  
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The trapezoidal rule uses the area of trapezoids for n subintervals or lengths to 










)( 110   (2.4) 
where ∆x = (b-a)/n, f(x) is the probability density function of winning the item, nyy ,...,0  
are the grid points in the integral, b is the upper bound of the integral and a is the lower 
bound of the integral. The probability weights at each point of the integral are x except 
at the tails where the probability weight is 2x . With the uniform distribution, n is 
assigned to be 100, resulting in a 100/1x , and a probability weight of 1/100 except at 
the tails where the probability weight is 1/200. A large number of points are used here to 
reduce discreteness that can reduce accuracy in a winner-take-all problem such as an 
auction. 
 
Particle Swarm Optimization 
The buyers and the seller in the agent-based auction use a PSO learning algorithm 
developed by Eberhart and Kennedy (1995) and modified by Zhang and Brorsen (2009) 
to choose their bid and reserve price strategies. PSO is a stochastic global optimization 
method that tends to converge faster than genetic algorithms. Zhang and Brorsen’s (2009) 
PSO algorithm has Kk ,...,1 parallel markets, and in each of the k parallel markets, the 
buying and selling agents have a clone participating in each one of the k markets. This 
idea of parallel markets came from watching the way flocks of birds share information to 
find food and avoid predators. The PSO algorithm gives each buyer and seller their own 
“flock of birds” to share information, but does not share information with the flocks of 
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other buyers and sellers. Similarly, we have k parallel auctions with each buying and 
selling agent having a clone in each of the k parallel auctions. Therefore, the kth clone of 
an agent chooses a bid or reserve price strategy in the kth auction. The agents use the 
parallel auctions to learn what are good and bad strategies by evaluating revenues for 
each of their clone’s strategies.  
The way the PSO works is the ith agent has a bid or reserve price strategy where 
they have a choice variable tkix ,,  in parallel auction k during iteration Tt ,...1 , and an 
adjustment velocity ]1,1[,, tkiv  that directs the agent to a new value for the choice 
variable. Each velocity change is a function of the local best solution
l
tkip ,, , where 
superscript l indicates the best solution in the local auction and the agent’s global best 
solution
g
tip , , where superscript g indicates the best global solution. The ith agent’s new 
choice variable in parallel auction k is updated by tkitkitki vxx ,,,,1,,  , and the velocity is  




tkitkitki xpuqxpuqwvv   
 (2.5) 
where w is the inertia weight factor, u1 and u2 are random variables distributed U[0,1], 
and q1 and q2 are learning parameters. The learning parameters are 
  TtTqq qqtt /11 10,2,1    where both 10
q and 11
q are constants set at one and 
500T is the maximum number of iterations. When selecting an inertia weight w there 
is an important tradeoff between exploration and convergence time to consider 
(Chatterjee and Siarry 2006). A large inertia weight slows convergence, but encourages 
agents to have a larger exploration area, while a small inertia weight increases 
convergence time, but reduces the agents’ exploration area (Zhang and Brorsen 2009). 
Zhang and Brorsen (2009) manage this tradeoff by letting w start high and decrease as the 
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model proceeds through the iterations, similar to the learning parameters. Inertia weight 




1 are constants set at 0.75.  
The strategy with the highest revenue for the agent in the kth auction is selected as 
the best local strategy. The agents’ best strategy depends on the other agents’ choice 
variables; therefore, the agent’s previous best strategy may not perform well in the next 
iteration. The other agents’ strategies in the current period are held constant and the past 
L best locals of each agent are reevaluated in auction k. The best local solution is 
expressed as  
  tkijtkikl Ltkikl tkikl tki xxRpRpRp ,,,,,,1,,,, )(),(),...,(maxarg   (2.6) 
where kR is the revenue in parallel market k. The best global solution is selected from the 
best local parameters and is  
  .)(,),(),(maxarg ,,2,,21,,1, l tKiKl til tigti pRpRpRp   (2.7) 
Table II-1 shows the values used for the PSO parameters. 
 
Convergence Criterion 
A convergence criterion is established to determine when the buyers and the seller cannot 
find bid and reserve price strategies that are an improvement from their previous 
strategies. The model converges when the total change in the previous 10 strategies for 
each of the agents is less than 0.0000001, and the total change in the standard deviations 
of the strategies are less than 0.00000001. The model has 100 runs (E=100), and each run 
has a maximum of 500 iterations (T=500). That is, the agents have 500 iterations (or 
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trades) to meet the convergence criterion, and this process is repeated 100 times. The 
results presented are the averages and standard deviations for all 100 runs. If the 
convergence criterion is met by all buying and selling agents, then the next run begins. 
But if the convergence criterion is not met by all buying and selling agents, then the next 
iteration begins, and the PSO learning algorithm guides the agents to improved strategies 
in the next iteration.  
 
Results 
Full Noise  
The agent-based auction model is initially set up with the noisy signals received by 
buyers and the seller to be distributed ]1,0[U , which represents an auction prior to MPR 
with symmetric buyers. The average winning bid price is 0.02, and the seller’s average 
reserve price is -0.31 (table II-2). The average winning bid price is below the buyers’ 
retail value of 0.5, which indicates that buyers shade bids. The average bid price for 
buyer one across all winning and losing bids is -0.24, and buyer one won, on average, 
36% of the items offered (table II-2). Buyer two’s average bid price is -0.26, and won, on 
average, 34% of the items offered (table II-2). Expected revenue per item for all items 
offered is 0.17 and 0.16 for buyer one and buyer two; respectively. Since buyer one and 
buyer two are identical, the difference in their average bid prices is due to randomness in 
the simulations. Seventy percent of the items are sold, and the seller’s expected revenue 
per item for all items sold or unsold is 0.01 (table II-2). Past research finds a reserve price 
can reduce the market power in an auction, and without a reserve price imposed by the 
seller, the seller’s expected revenue would be lower
1
 (Leven and Smith 1996; Reiley 
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2006; Riley and Samuelson 1981). But this past research has not given sellers a noisy 
reserve price.  
Njoroge (2003) proposes buyers are asymmetric in cattle markets, so we set up an 
agent-based auction model with asymmetric buyers. Buyer one receives a noisy signal 
distributed ]2/1,0[U while buyer two and the seller receive a noisy signal distributed 
]1,0[U . This scenario corresponds to an auction prior to MPR when buyer one has better 
information about prices paid for cattle than the seller and buyer two. The average 
winning bid price is 0.01, and the average reserve price is -0.38 (table II-2). Expected 
revenue per item and the probability of winning the item for buyer one increases, and 
buyer two’s expected revenue per item decreases slightly when buyer one has better 
information about prices than buyer two (table II-2). The seller’s expected revenue per 
item does not change from the scenario with symmetric buyers prior to MPR (table II-2). 
Compared to the symmetric buyers’ results, buyer one benefits from having better 
information than buyer two, which is anticipated, and the seller’s expected revenue per 
item does not change. 
 
Reduced Noise 
Results for the agent-based auction are presented in table II-2 when the noisy signal the 
seller receives is reduced to be distributed ]2/1,0[U , and the buyers’ noisy signal is 
distributed ]1,0[U . This scenario represents an auction after MPR, where additional 
public information reduces the seller’s uncertainty about the value of the item, but it does 
not reduce the buyers’ uncertainty. Compared to the results from the scenarios with full 
noise, the average winning bid price increases to 0.11, and the seller’s average reserve 
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price increases to -0.08 (table II-2). The probability of winning the item decreases for the 
buyers, and their expected revenues per item decrease (table II-2). The seller’s expected 
revenue per item increases to 0.06, and the probably of a transaction occurring decreases 
(table II-2). When the seller’s noisy signal about the value of the item is reduced, the 
buyers’ market power decreases and the seller expected revenue per item increases. This 
finding shows that the seller benefit from reduced uncertainty, which extends the auction 
literature.  
Table II-2 also presents results with both buyers’ noisy signals reduced to 
]2/1,0[U and the seller’s noisy signal remains ]1,0[U . This scenario symbolizes an 
auction after MPR, where additional public information reduces buyers’ uncertainty 
about the value of the item, but the seller’s uncertainty is not reduced. The average 
winning bid price is 0.05, and the seller’s average reserve price is -0.46 (table II-2). The 
buyers’ market power or bid-shading is reduced when the buyers’ noisy signal decreases. 
Relative to the full noise results, the probability of winning the item for the buyers 
increases as well as their expected revenues per item (table II-2), and the seller’s 
probability of selling the item increases and the seller’s expected revenue per item 
increases 0.05 (table II-2). Similar to results when the seller’s noise is reduced, these 
results reveal that sellers benefit when only the buyers’ noisy signal decreases due to 
additional public information. This finding matches Milgrom and Weber’s (1982) 
theoretical model and Kagel and Levin’s (1986) human experiment; however, neither 
allows sellers to impose a reserve price. The information made available from the MPR 
legislation should level the playing field for buyers by making them symmetric, and 
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results show that the seller still benefits even if only one buyer gains information. This is 
counter to what Njoroge (2003) and Njoroge et al. (2007) conclude. 
When the noisy signals that the seller and the buyers receive are all reduced by 
half, the average winning bid price increases to 0.10 (table II-2). The reduction of noise 
in the seller’s reserve price and the buyers’ bid price increases competition between 
buyers enough to increase the average winning bid price (table II-2). Relative to the full 
noise scenarios, the seller’s average reserve price and their expected revenue per item 
increases (table II-2). Results from this scenario are similar to the results from the other 
scenarios when the uncertainty in the auction market is reduced, the seller benefits.  
The agent-based auction is not an actual cattle auction and actual markets differ 
from the model in numerous ways; however, the model provides a theoretical argument 
that reducing uncertainty through the USDA-AMS reports created by MPR decreases 
meat packers’ market power, increases competition between meat packers, and increases 
the seller’s expected revenue. This conclusion matches what Azzam (2003) finds 
theoretically and what Koontz and Ward (2011) believe is likely the result of MPR. 
Furthermore, if buyers with different levels of information are participating in an auction, 
then MPR would still benefit sellers. Even though inconsistent theoretical conclusions 
about MPR are still evident, the agent-based auction provides unique theoretical evidence 
that supports MPR as beneficial to producers.  
  
Conclusions 
We establish an agent-based, first-price common-value auction that allows the seller to 
impose a reserve price. This model is created to simulate fed cattle markets to determine 
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how packers’ market power changes with the implementation of MPR. Past theoretical 
models have disagreed about whether or not producers benefit from MPR, and recent 
empirical work has even shown packers’ market packer in cattle markets increased after 
MPR (Cai, Stiegert, and Koontz 2011). Koontz and Ward (2011) express concern that 
there are several questions about MPR that remain unanswered.  
The theoretical models in the MPR literature follow a Cournot framework. We 
use an agent-based common value auction model to determine the changes in market 
power after MPR. An auction model approach is closer to actual cattle procurement than 
the Cournot models, and is a unique theoretical contribution to the MPR literature. The 
common value auction with a reserve price is intractable to solve analytically so we 
develop an agent-based auction model, which makes the agent-based auction model an 
appropriate method to apply to this problem. Additionally, by giving the seller a noisy 
reserve price signal, we are able to determine how reducing the seller’s uncertainty 
affects the buyers’ market power, which is a contribution to the auction literature.  
The agent-based common value auction models show that the average winning 
bid price increases and the buyers’ market power decreases when the buyers’ and/or the 
seller’s noisy signal is reduced, and the seller’s expected revenue increases. These 
conclusions match results from human experiments (Kagel and Levin 1986), and auction 
theory (Milgrom and Weber 1982). The agent-based auction indicates that if the MPR 
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Table II-1. Parameter Values for the Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm 
Parameter Symbol Value 
Intercept of inertia weight w
0  0.75 
Slope of inertia weight w
1  0.75 
Learning parameters intercept q
0  0.75 
Learning parameter slope q
1  0.75 
Parallel markets k 10 
Maximum iterations T 500 
Evolutions E 100 







Table II-2. Equilibrium Values for the Agent-Based Duopsony Auctions 
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Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The competitive solution with no noise is a winning bid price of 0.5 with buyers having zero revenue. 
a All results, except average winning bid price, are unconditional on winning.  
b Errors for both the buyers and the seller are distributed U[0,1]. 
c Errors for buyer one is U[0,0.5] and for buyer two and the seller are U[0,1]. 
d Errors for the seller is distributed U[0,0.5] and the errors for the buyers are distributed U[0,1]. 
e Errors for the buyer is distributed U[0,0.5] and the errors for the seller are distributed U[0,1]. 


















COMMON-VALUE AUCTION VERSUS POSTED-PRICE  
SELLING: AN AGENT-BASED MODEL APPROACH 
Introduction 
With the recent development and easy access to online selling methods, sellers can 
choose to sell an item using either a posted-price market (e.g., Craigslist) or an auction 
(e.g., eBay). When the market-clearing price for the item is uncertain such as art, cattle, 
and government bonds, sellers are normally thought to prefer an auction over a posted-
price market (Milgrom 1989). An auction allows sellers to discover the market-clearing 
price for the item through competition among buyers, which can be more profitable for 
sellers than a posted price. However, the theoretical literature reveals that auctioning an 
item does not always produce larger revenue for sellers than a posted-price market 
(Campbell and Levin 2006; Kultti 1999), and experimental data shows sellers commonly 
choose to sell an item with a posted price instead of using an auction (Hammond 2010).  
 Auctions are normally classified into three types: (1) private value, (2) affiliated 
value, and (3) common value (Krishna 2002; Milgrom and Weber 1982). Wang (1993) 
compares a seller’s revenue from selling an item with a posted price to selling the same 
item using an auction with a reserve price when the buyers have independent private 
values for the item. Buyers with independent private values means buyers have their own 
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unique value of the item (Paarsch 1992). Wang (1993) uses a theoretical model with the 
buyers having a noisy price signal and the seller having perfect information about the 
value of the item. Wang (1993) finds the auction is always optimal for sellers when the 
cost of auctioning the item is zero, but when there is an auctioning cost for the seller, the 
optimal selling method depends on the steepness of the seller’s marginal revenue curve. 
Campbell and Levin (2006) compare sellers’ revenue from selling an item with a posted 
price to auctioning it when the buyers’ values for the item are affiliated, which means 
buyers’ values might depend on a common unknown signal and buyers’ individual values 
(Pinkse and Tan 2005). They use a theoretical model to demonstrate that an auction is not 
always optimal for a seller when buyers’ values for the item are interdependent. 
Furthermore, Wang (1998) uses a similar theoretical model to Wang (1993) to show that 
auctioning an item is more profitable for the seller when buyers’ private values are 
correlated, and Julien et al. (2002) use backwards induction to show that sellers are 
always better off selling the item in an auction with and without a reserve price than with 
a posted price. 
Kultti (1999) adapts Lu and McAfee’s (1996) model of an auction and a 
bargaining market to compare sellers’ utility from selling an item with a posted-price 
market to selling via an auction when the value of the item being sold is common among 
buyers. When buyers have a common value for the item, the resale value of the item is 
equal across all buyers, but uncertainty about the value of the item results in each buyer 
potentially having a different estimate of the value (Kagel and Levin 2002). A classic 
example of a common-value auction in the literature is oil lease auctions (Capen et al. 
1971; Kagel and Levin 2002). Kultti develops a model that compares the expected utility 
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for buyers and sellers in a posted-price market and auction by evaluating the probability 
of buyers and sellers meeting in each market. Using evolutionary game dynamics, Kultti 
finds that the seller’s expected utility in the posted-price market and the auction are 
always equivalent because the probability of buyers and sellers meeting in each market 
are equivalent. More recently, Hammond (2010) presents unique results from a field 
experiment of selling compact discs in an online ascending-bid second-price auction with 
a reserve price and an online posted-price market. Hammond (2010) cannot reject 
revenue equivalence for the sellers in the posted-price and auction markets, and also finds 
that the posted-price markets had a higher selling price and lower probability of selling 
the item than the auctions.  
 While Kultti (1999) does compare these selling methods when buyers have a 
common value, his model uses a different framework from Wang’s (1993) private value 
model and Campbell and Levin’s (2006) affiliated value model, which compare seller’s 
revenue when sellers choose a reserve price and buyers choose a bid price while 
receiving a noisy price signal. Kultti (1999) compares the probability of buyers and 
sellers meeting in each market and does not consider bid shading due to buyer 
uncertainty. A model with buyers and sellers receiving a noisy price signal that allowed 
comparing a seller’s revenue from auctioning an item with and without a reserve price to 
selling the item with a posted price when the item has a common value among buyers 
would be a unique contribution to the posted price and auction literature. 
 Solving a common-value auction analytically is difficult and allowing the seller to 
impose a reserve price (minimum bid) perhaps makes it intractable (Gordy 1998), and 
reproducing a common-value auction and a posted-price market in a laboratory or field 
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experiment would likely require many rounds and a large sample, which would be 
expensive to obtain. Agent-based computational modeling is an alternative approach that 
can be used to compare these two selling methods. Economists use agent-based models to 
test economic theories when the problem is intractable and obtaining data is expensive 
(Alkemade et al. 2006; Arifovic 1996; Bonabeua 2002). These models are artificial 
markets where interactive agents simulate economic markets following trading and 
equilibrium rules (Tesfatsion 2001). Recently, Noe et al. (2011) successfully developed 
an agent-based common-value auction to examine how bid prices change under retail 
price uncertainty. We develop an agent-based common-value auction with a reserve price 
and an agent-based posted-price market to compare the seller’s expected revenue. Our 
common-value auction model extends Noe et al.’s (2011) model by allowing the seller to 
impose a reserve price, and by giving buyers and the seller a noisy price signal. 
Additionally, using agent-based models allows us to relax the assumption of symmetric 
buyers found in previous theoretical work (Campbell and Levin 2006; Wang 1993), and 
we can evaluate these selling methods with asymmetric buyers.  
 We compare the seller’s expected revenue from selling an item in a first-price 
common-value auction with a reserve price and in a posted-price market to determine the 
selling method that provides the seller with the larger expected revenue. We develop an 
agent-based posted-price market with two buyers and one seller, and an agent-based first-
price common-value auction with a reserve price that includes two buyers and one seller. 
In the posted-price model, the seller chooses a posted price for the item being sold, and 
buyers choose their willingness-to-pay. Buyers purchase the item at the posted price 
when their willingness-to-pay is greater than or equal to the seller’s posted price. In the 
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auction model, the seller chooses a reserve price and buyers choose their bid price. 
Buyers purchase the item at their bid price when their bid price is greater than or equal to 
the seller’s reserve price and greater than the other buyer’s bid. In both markets, buyers 
and the seller use a particle swarm optimization (PSO) learning algorithm developed by 
Zhang and Brorsen (2009) combined with numerical integration to find their best strategy 
(bid price, reserve price, willingness-to-pay, and posted price).  
 
Theory of Agent-Based Models 
We make similar assumptions in our agent-based models about the buyers and sellers 
cost structures to Wang’s (1993) model. The cost to store the item when it is not sold is 
the buyers’ retail value of the item, which is the same
2
 for the seller in the auction and 
posted-price market. Also, we assume buyers’ search cost is equal in the posted-price 
market and in the auction. This means buyers in the auction would have the same cost of 
searching for the same item in other auctions as buyers in the posted-price market 
searching for the same item in other posted-price markets. Finally, the cost of setting up 
and organizing an auction is equal to the cost of setting up and organizing a posted-price 
market. 
 
Common Value Auction 
The winner’s curse phenomenon is well documented in human and field experiments 
(Kagel and Levin 2002) as well as in actual (Capen et al. 1971) common-value auctions. 
This occurs when buyers estimate the value of an item to be greater than the item’s true 
                                                          
2
 Storage costs are assumed to be 0.5 and since the value of the item is 0.5, an equivalent assumption would 
be to assume that the item is perishable.  
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value, and bid their estimated values for the item, which results in the winning buyer 
receiving a negative profit for the item. If the winner’s curse is present in the common-
value auction model, then an auction might produce larger expected revenue for the seller 
than a posted price. Conversely, bid-shading by buyers is sustainable in common-value 
auctions (Klemperer 1999) and in repeated game auctions (McAfee and McMillan 1987). 
If bid-shading occurs, the seller might be worse off auctioning the item. The winner’s 
curse is not expected to occur in our model due to the learning algorithm, and bid-shading 
by buyers is expected, which is what Noe et al. (2011) found.  
Our agent-based first-price common-value auction model is based on the model 
used in Kagel and Levin’s (1986) human experiment. A slight modification we make to 
Kagel and Levin (1986) is the agent-based auction assumes a constant true value that is 
greater than zero instead of randomly generating a new true value in each repeated 
auction. They randomly generated a new true value for the item being auctioned in each 
repeated auction because otherwise buyers might base their bid on the previous true value 
of the item instead of their signal. Buyers in the agent-based auction cannot learn the true 
value of the item; thus, it is not necessary to randomly generate a new true value for the 
item in each repeated auction and bids are evaluated around some constant true value that 
is greater than zero. In the agent-based auction, bid prices are submitted by buyers with 
homogeneous preferences for an item based on their noisy information signal. The bid 
function follows previous bid functions in common-value auctions (Andreoni and Miller 
1995; Kagel and Levin 1986), and is   
 iii xb   (3.1) 
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where bi is the bid price for buyer i=1, 2, ]1,1[ ix  is the choice variable in the auction 
for buyer i, and ]1,0[~ Ui  jiji  0),cov(  is the noisy signal buyer i receives 
about the value of the item.  
Another modification we make to Kagel and Levin (1986) is we allow the seller 
to impose a reserve price. The seller’s reserve price is  mr where ]1,1[ m  is the 
seller’s choice variable, and ]1,0[~ U  is the noisy signal and is independent of buyers’ 
signals. By giving the seller a noisy signal about the value of the item, we can test 
Milgrom’s (1989) theory that an uncertain value for an item usually results in the auction 
being preferred by sellers over a posted price. According to Milgrom (1989), the seller’s 
noisy signal about the value of the item should cause the seller to prefer the agent-based 
auction over the agent-based posted-price market. Results are also included when the 
seller has perfect information about the reserve price. When the seller’s reserve price is 
not stochastic, the reserve price should converge to the seller’s true value of zero (Levin 
and Smith 1996). Furthermore, we present results for an agent-based common-value 
auction without a reserve price. Buyers must bid greater than the other buyer and greater 
than or equal to the seller’s reserve price to win the item. In this model, expected revenue 
for buyer one is 
 ]][][)[(][ 12111 rbIbbIbXERE
B   (3.2) 
where BR1 is the expected revenue for buyer one, ][ 21 bbI   is an indicator function for 
when buyers one’s bid price is greater than buyer two’s bid price, ][ 1 rbI   is an indicator 
function for when buyer one’s bid price is greater than the reserve price, and X is the 
buyers’ retail value of the item being sold. The buyers’ retail value is X=0.5. Buyers are 
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bid-shading when the average winning bid price is less than 0.5, and the winner’s curse 
outcome is present if the average winning bid price is greater than 0.5.  
  The seller’s expected revenue is the sum of buyer one’s bid price multiplied by 
the probability of buyer one winning the item and buyer two’s bid price multiplied by the 











S PjirbbbREXRE  (3.3) 
where SR is the expected revenue for the representative seller, and Pi is the probability 
buyer i wins the item.  
 
Posted Price Market 
Classical economic models derive the seller’s optimal posted price by equating marginal 
revenue with marginal cost. Search models were developed by Stigler (1961) and McCall 
(1965) that consider the buyers’ cost of searching for the lowest posted price available, 
and are commonly used in the posted-price market literature. In search models, the 
seller’s optimal posted price is a balance of the probability of selling the item, buyers’ 
search cost, and the price the seller is willing-to-accept for the item (Arnold and Lippman 
2001). Previous theoretical work reveals a posted-price market can produce larger 
expected revenue than an auction for the seller in an affiliated-value auction (Campbell 
and Levin 2006). However, a posted-price market has not been compared to a common-
value auction.  
Similar to the agent-based auctions, the buyers in the agent-based posted-price market do 
not learn the retail value of the item; thus, it is not necessary to randomly generate a new 
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true value for the item in each repeated auction and bids are evaluated around some 
constant true value that is greater than zero. Buyers with homogeneous preferences 
submit their willingness-to-pay for the item based on their noisy information signal. 
Buyers i’s willingness-to-pay function is  
 iii yw   (3.4) 
where wi is the willingness-to-pay for buyer i=1, 2, ]1,1[ iy  is the choice variable in 
the posted-price market for buyer i, ]1,0[~ Ui  jiji  0),cov(  is the noisy signal 
buyer i receives about the value of the item.  
The seller sets a posted price  zp where ]1,1[ z  is the seller’s choice 
variable in the posted-price market, and ]1,0[~ U  is the noisy signal and is independent 
of buyers’ signals. We also present results when the seller has perfect information. 
Buyers must be willing to pay a value greater than or equal to the seller’s posted price to 








where BR1 is the expected revenue for buyer one, X is the buyers’ retail value of the item 
being sold, ][ 2 pwI   is an indicator function for when buyers two’s willingness-to-pay 
is greater than or equal to the posted price, and ][ 1 pwI   is an indicator function for 
when buyer one’s willingness-to-pay is greater than the posted price. In the agent-based 
posted-price model, agents arrive in the market at the same time; therefore, when both 
buyers have willingness-to-pay greater than or equal to the posted price, the buyers 
equally split the item being sold. As in the auction, the buyers’ retail value in the posted-
price market is X=0.5. 
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  When the willingness-to-pay is less than the seller’s posted price then the seller 
does not sell the item and the seller’s revenue is zero. The seller’s expected revenue is 
similar to the seller’s expected revenue in an auction, but the seller only receives the 
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where SR is the expected revenue for the representative seller, and Pi is the probability 
buyer i purchases the item.  
 
Method  
Figure III-1 summarizes the general process of the agent-based auction with a reserve 
price. Buyers choose a bid price strategy and the seller chooses a reserve price strategy. 
Numerical integration is used to estimate the agents’ expected revenues, the average 
winning bid price, average reserve price, average bid prices, and probability of each 
buyer winning. Finally, the agents’ strategies are tested to determine if the convergence 
criterion for equilibrium is satisfied. If the convergence criterion for equilibrium is not 
satisfied, then the particle swarm optimization (PSO) learning algorithm directs the 
agents to improved strategies in the next iteration, and if the convergence criterion is met, 
then the model advances to the next run.  
 Figure III-2 outlines a similar process of the agent-based posted-price market. The 
seller chooses a posted price strategy for the item, and buyers choose their willingness-to-
pay for the item. Numerical integration is used to estimate the agents’ expected revenues, 
the average selling posted price, average reserve price, average willingness-to-pay, and 
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probability of each buyer winning. The same convergence criterion is used in the posted-
price model as the auction model. The posted-price model and auction model are run 
separately with two buyers and one seller in each market.  
We run the posted-price market and auction under several different scenarios. 
First, we give the seller perfect information (or no noisy signal), but buyers do have a 
noisy signal. Then, we run the models with the seller receiving a noisy signal. This allows 
determining how a seller’s uncertainty affects the seller’s decision to sell an item with an 
auction or with a posted price. We also run the auction and posted-price models with 
asymmetric buyers to determine if unbalanced information across buyers influences the 
seller’s selling decision. Lastly, the results are included for the common-value auction 
without a reserve price to compare to a posted-price market. 
 
Numerical Integration 
We extend Zhang and Brorsen (2009) by combining numerical integration with the PSO 
learning algorithm to solve agent-based models when the agents have a noisy signal. 
Buying and selling agents each choose their strategy in the separate markets and the 
trapezoidal rule is used to approximate the buying and selling agents’ expected revenues. 
Other integration algorithms such as Gaussian quadrature (Miller and Rice 1983) could 
be used to approximate these integrals, but the trapezoidal rule is chosen because it is 
efficient enough for the problem being considered and is straightforward to program.  
The trapezoidal rule uses the area of trapezoids for n subintervals or lengths to 
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where ∆x = (b-a)/n, f(x) is the probability density function of winning the item, nyy ,...,0  
are the grid points in the integral, b is the upper bound of the integral and a is the lower 
bound of the integral. The probability weights at each point of the integral are x except 
at the tails where the probability weight is 2x . With the uniform distribution, n is 
assigned to be 100, resulting in a 100/1x , a distance of 1/100 between the points in 
the integral, and a probability weight of 1/100 accepts at the tails where the probability 
weight is 1/200. A large number of points are used here to reduce discreteness that can 
reduce accuracy in a winner-take-all auction.  
 
Particle Swarm Optimization 
The buyers and the seller in the agent-based models use a PSO learning algorithm 
developed by Eberhart and Kennedy (1995) and modified by Zhang and Brorsen (2009) 
to choose their strategies. PSO is a stochastic global optimization method that tends to 
converge faster than genetic algorithms (Zhang and Brorsen 2009). In Zhang and 
Brorsen’s (2009) PSO algorithm, there are Kk ,...,1 parallel markets, and each buying 
and selling agent has k clones. The idea of parallel markets with clones came from 
watching the way flocks of birds share information to find food and avoid predators. The 
PSO algorithm gives each buyer and seller their own “flock of birds” or clones to share 
information, but the clones do not share information with the clones of the other buyer or 
those of the seller. The agents use their clones’ strategies in the parallel markets to 
determine the strategy that produces the largest revenue. The same number of parallel 
markets is used for the posted-price market and the auction.  
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In the PSO, the ith agent has a choice variable tkix ,,  in parallel market k during 
iteration Tt ,...,1 , and an adjustment velocity ]1,1[,, tkiv  that directs the agent to a 
new value for the choice variable. Each velocity change is a function of the local best 
solution
l
tkip ,,  where superscript l indicates the best solution in the local market and the 
agent’s global best solution
g
tip ,  where superscript g indicates the best global solution. The 
ith agent’s new choice variable in parallel market k is updated by tkitkitki vxx ,,,,1,,    
and the velocity is  




tkitkitki xpuqxpuqwvv   
  (3.8) 
where w is the inertia weight factor, u1 and u2 are random variables distributed U[0,1], 
and q1 and q2 are learning parameters. The learning parameters are 
  TtTqq qqtt /11 10,2,1    where both 10
q and 11
q are constants set at one and 
500T is the maximum number of iterations. When selecting an inertia weight w there 
is an important tradeoff between exploration and convergence time to consider 
(Chatterjee and Siarry 2006). A large inertia weight slows convergence, but allows agents 
to have a larger exploration area, while a small inertia weight increases convergence 
time, but reduces the agents’ exploration area (Zhang and Brorsen 2009). Zhang and 
Brorsen (2009) manage this tradeoff by letting w start high and decrease as the model 
proceeds through the iterations, similar to the learning parameters. Inertia weight 




1 are constants set at 0.75.  
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At each iteration, the strategy with the largest revenue for the agent in the kth 
market is chosen as the best local strategy. The agents’ best strategy depends on the other 
agents’ choice variables; therefore, the agent’s previous best strategy may not perform 
well in the next iteration. The other agents’ strategies in the current period are held 
constant and the past L best locals of each agent are reevaluated in market k. The best 
local solution is expressed as  
 
 
 tkijtkikl Ltkikl tkikl tki xxRpRpRp ,,,,,,1,,,, )(),(),...,(maxarg   (3.9) 
where kR is the revenue in parallel market k. The best global solution is selected from the 
best local parameters and is  
  .)(,),(),(maxarg ,,2,,21,,1, l tKiKl til tigti pRpRpRp   (3.10)  
Table III-1 shows the values for the PSO parameters used for the agent-based markets. 
 
Convergence Criterion 
A convergence criterion is established to determine when the buyers and the seller cannot 
find bid and reserve price strategies that improve upon their previous strategies. The 
model converges when the total change in the previous 10 strategies for each of the 
agents is less than 0.0000001 and the total change in the standard deviations of the 
strategies are less than 0.00000001. The model has 200 runs (E=200), and in each run 
there is a maximum of 500 iterations (T=500). That is, the agents have 500 iterations (or 
trades) to meet the convergence criterion, and this is repeated 200 times. The results 
presented are the agents’ averages and standard deviations for all 200 runs. If the 
convergence criterion is met by all buying and selling agents, then the next run begins, 
but if the convergence criterion is not met by all buying and selling agents, then the next 
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iteration begins and the PSO learning algorithm guides the agents to improved strategies 
in the next iteration.  
 
Results 
Common Value Auction  
Results for the agent-based first-price common-value auction without a reserve price are 
displayed in the first column of Table III-2. The average winning bid price for the item is 
-0.17, which is interpreted as the average winning bid price is 0.17 below the constant 
positive true value (table III-2). Buyer one has a slightly higher average bid price, 
probability of winning the item, and expected revenue than buyer two. Buyers are 
programmed to be identical so randomness in the PSO algorithm explains the minor 
differences. The seller’s expected revenue per item is -0.17, and since the seller has no 
reserve price, every item is sold (table III-2). The winner’s curse does not occur in the 
agent-based common-value auction without a reserve price, and buyers’ shade bids below 
their retail value. 
The second column of Table III-2 shows the results for the agent-based common-
value auction with a reserve price, which is an extension of Noe et al.’s (2011) model. 
When the seller has perfect information, the average winning bid price is 0.21, and the 
average reserve price is -0.01. The buyers’ expected revenues per item for all winning 
and losing bids are 0.09 (table III-2). The item is sold 60% of the time it is offered, and 
the seller’s expected revenue per item is 0.13 (table III-2). Allowing the seller to choose a 
reserve price in the agent-based common-value auction increases the average winning bid 
price, but buyers’ still shade bids below the retail value of the item.  
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 In the third column of Table III-2, results are presented for the agent-based 
common-value auction when the seller sets a reserve price based on a noisy signal. The 
average winning bid price in the common-value auction is 0.04 and the average reserve 
price is -0.31(table III-2). Compared to the auction results when the seller has perfect 
information, the average winning bid price and reserve price decreases, the buyers’ 
expected revenues per item increase, and the seller’s expected revenue per item decreases 
(table III-2). Buyers are able to increase their bid-shading in the agent-based common-
value auction when the seller receives a noisy reserve price signal, explaining why 
buyers’ expected revenues per item increases and the seller’s expected revenue per item 
decreases.  
 Next, we reduce buyers’ noisy signal to be distributed U[0,1/2], and the seller’s 
noisy signal remains distributed U[0,1]. That is, the buyers have more information about 
the value of the item than the seller. Results are displayed in the fourth column of Table 
III-2. The average winning bid price is 0.06, and the average reserve price is -0.44 (table 
III-2). The average winning bid price increases when the buyers receive more 
information, which matches Milgrom and Weber’s (1982) theoretical results. Reducing 
both buyers’ noisy signals in the agent-based common-value auction causes buyers’ and 
the seller’s expected revenue to increase (table III-2).  
 Finally, we present results for an agent-based common-value auction when the 
buyers are asymmetric (table III-2). An advantage of agent-based models is the 
assumption of symmetric buyers found in previous work can be relaxed, which provides 
an additional theoretical contribution to the auction and posted-price market literature. 
Buyer one has a noisy signal that is distributed ]2/1,0[U while buyer two and the seller 
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receives a noisy signal distributed ]1,0[U , representing buyer one having more 
information about the value of the item than the seller and buyer two. The average 
winning bid price is 0.03 and the average reserve price is -0.41 (table III-2). Since buyer 
one has less uncertainty than buyer two, buyer one has a higher average bid price, 
probability of winning, and expected revenue per item than buyer two. The seller’s 
expected revenue per item did not change from when symmetric buyers are participating 
in the auction (table III-2). Overall, asymmetric buyers in a first-price common-value 
auction with a reserve price do not affect the seller’s expected revenue, and appears to 
only benefit the buyer with less uncertainty. 
 
Posted Price Market 
Table III-3 displays the results for the agent-based posted-price market when the buyers 
have a common value for the item. When the seller has perfect information, the average 
selling posted price is 0.25 (table III-3). Buyer one and buyer two have expected revenues 
per item of 0.06, and the seller’s expected revenue per item is 0.13 (table III-3). 
Compared to the common-value auction results when the seller does not impose a reserve 
price, the seller’s expected revenue is higher in the posted-price market. However, when 
the seller imposes a reserve price in the auction and has perfect information, the seller is 
indifferent between these selling methods. Note that in all scenarios, a transaction is more 
likely to occur in the auction market than in the posted price market. 
 The seller is also given a noisy posted price signal and results are presented in the 
second column of Table III-3. The average selling posted price for the item is 0.10, each 
buyer has an expected revenue per item of 0.08, and the seller’s expected revenue per 
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item is 0.03 (table III-3). With the addition of price uncertainty by the seller in the 
posted-price market, average selling price decreases, expected revenues per item increase 
for the buyers, and the seller’s expected revenue per item decreases. The agent-based 
models results reveal that when the buyers have a common value for the item being sold 
the seller’s expected revenue per item in a posted-price market is equivalent to the 
seller’s expected revenue in an auction with a reserve price.  
 In the third column of Table III-3, results are shown when the buyers noisy signal 
is reduced to be distributed U[0,1/2] and the seller’s noisy signal is distributed U[0,1]. 
This represents a posted-price market when buyers have more information about the 
value of the item than the seller. Buyers increase their willingness-to-pay for the item, but 
the seller chooses to decrease their average selling posted price to 0.06 (table III-3). Both 
buyers have expected revenue per item of 0.12, and the seller’s expected revenue per item 
is 0.02, which is a slight decrease from when they have equal uncertainty (table III-3). 
Compared to the auction when buyers have less uncertainty than the seller, the seller 
receives slightly smaller expected revenue in a posted-price market. This result indicates 
that when buyers’ uncertainty is reduced by half the seller is slightly better off auctioning 
the item when buyers have a common value for the item. Seller uncertainty hurts the 
seller more in the posted price market than it does in the auction. This result is consistent 
with Milgorm and Weber’s (1982) conclusion that a posted price does not work well 
when the seller does not know what posted price to choose.  
 Finally, results are presented in the fourth column of Table III-3 when asymmetric 
buyers participate in the posted-price market. This scenario matches the asymmetric 
buyers in the agent-based auction with buyer one having less uncertainty (or more 
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information) than buyer two and the seller. The average selling posted price is 0.09, 
which is a slight decrease from when symmetric buyers are participating in the posted-
price market (table III-3). The seller’s expected revenue per item does not change from 
when symmetric buyers are participating in the posted-price market, and is equivalent to 
the seller’s expected revenue per item in the auction with symmetric and asymmetric 
buyers. We can conclude that asymmetric buyers do not affect the seller’s choice of 
selling an item in an auction or posted-price market when the value of the item is 
common between buyers. Results appear to suggest when only one buyer’s noisy signal is 
reduced by half then the seller is indifferent between the selling methods. 
 
Conclusions 
We compare the seller’s expected revenue from selling an item in an auction with a 
reserve price and a posted-price market when the item being sold has a common value 
between the buyers. An agent-based first-price common-value auction with a reserve 
price and an agent-based posted-price market are developed to determine the method that 
is optimal for the seller. Our approach to comparing these selling methods is 
straightforward and similar to Wang’s (1993) private value models and Campbell and 
Levin (2006) affiliated value models. The results from the agent-based model provide a 
unique theoretical contribution to the literature.   
  Solving for the equilibrium of a common-value auction with a noisy reserve price 
is perhaps intractable and obtaining data through human and field experiments is 
expensive and cannot control for participates motivation. An agent-based model approach 
is an appropriate and unique way to address the objective. An agent-based common-value 
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auction was recently presented by Noe et al. (2011), but we extend this model by 
allowing the seller to impose a reserve price, and give the buyers and the seller a noisy 
price signal. The agent-based auction model extends the agent-based modeling literature 
by giving the seller a reserve price.  
 The results from the agent-based models show that the seller receives larger 
expected revenue from selling the item in a posted-price market than an auction without a 
reserve price. When the seller imposes a reserve price, the seller is indifferent between 
the first-price auction and the posted-price market when (1) the seller has perfect 
information and the buyers have a noisy price signal, and (2) when the buyers and the 
seller have equal noisy signals. These results from the agent-based model match what 
Kultti (1999) found with his theoretical model. We also show when the buyers are 
asymmetric in the models, the seller’s expected revenue is equivalent in the posted-price 
market and auction with a reserve price. However, when both buyers’ noisy signals are 
reduced by half, the seller is slightly better off auctioning the item with a reserve price. In 
the agent-based model, buyers’ bid prices increase when their uncertainty decreases, 
which matches Milgrom and Weber’s (1982) theory, resulting in the seller’s expected 
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Table III-1. Parameter Values for the Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm 
Parameter Symbol Value 
Intercept of inertia weight w
0  0.75 
Slope of inertia weight w
1  0.75 
Learning parameters intercept q
0  0.75 
Learning parameter slope q
1  0.75 
Parallel markets k 10 
Maximum iterations T 500 
Evolutions E 200 




Table III-2. Equilibrium Values for the Agent-Based Common-Value Auctions 
  Scenario 
Category
a
 No Reserve price 
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Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
a
 All results, except average winning bid price, are not conditional on winning.  
b
 The seller’s reserve price is not a function of a noisy signal but buyers noisy signal is distributed U[0,1]. 
c
 Seller and buyers noisy signals are independently distributed U [0,1]. 
d
 Errors for the buyers are distributed U [0,0.5] and the errors for the seller is distributed U [0,1]. 
e




Table III-3. Equilibrium Values for the Agent-Based Posted-Price Market with a Common Value 
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Information
b




















Buyer 1      



























Buyer 2     



























Seller     


















Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
a
 All results, except average selling posted price, are not conditional on winning.  
b
 The seller’s posted price is not a function of a noisy signal but buyers noisy signal is distributed U [0,1]. 
c
 Seller and buyers noisy signals are independently distributed U [0,1]. 
d
 Errors for the buyers are distributed U [0,0.5] and the errors for the seller is distributed U [0,1]. 
e
























APPENDIX A--Program Loops for Calculating Probabilities 
Layers of three loops are programmed to approximate the expected revenues in the agent-
based model: (1) an outside loop, (2) a middle loop, and (3) an inside loop. The seller’s 
noisy reserve price is  mr where  the noisy signal is in the outside loop and m is 
the seller’s choice variable or strategy. The outside loop starts with 0  and 
 increases by 100/1x  until 1 . The probability weight for the outside loop is w . 
Within the outside loop, the middle loop begins, where buyers are given a noisy signal. 
For buyer one, its noisy bid price is  11 xb  where  is the noisy signal for the buyers 
and x1 is buyer one’s choice variable or strategy. The middle loop starts with 0  and 
 increases by x  until 1 . The probability weight for this loop is w . Within the 
middle loop, the inside loop starts and calculates the probability of winning for the 
buyers. Following the example for buyer one, in the inside loop buyer two’s noisy bid 
price is  22 xb  where is the noisy signal in the inside loop and x2 is buyer two’s 
choice variable or strategy. The inside loop starts with 0  and  increases by x  
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where )( 1bF is the probability of buyer one winning the item being offered. The same 
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where )( 2bF is the probability of buyer one winning the item being offered. When this 
loop is complete, expected revenue for the buyers and the seller are approximated in the 
middle loop. Buyer one’s expected revenue is  
 






1 , (A.3) 
buyer two’s expected revenue is  
 






2 , (A.4) 
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The average winning bid price for the item is ))]()(/([ 21 bFbFRWB
S  . 
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APPENDIX B--Mandatory Price Reporting Program 
package PSOmpr; 
/* Program Name: Mandatory Price Reporting Act   
* Author: Chris Boyer  
* Date:   9/10/11 
*/ 
 
/* ******************Program Files 
description:************************************************* 
 * 1. Buyer: models the buyers' behavior; all buyers have the same behavioral rule but have different 
initialized starting values; 
 * 2. PSO: models the PSO algorithm, have two functions: 
 *        a). retest and selected best locals for each parallel market;  
 *        b). select the best global for all markets;  *      
 * 3. ModelPSO:  Main program; 
 * 4. PSOEquilibrium: program to determine the equilibrium; 
 * 5. RetailMarket: retail price is perfect elastic, and is $100 all the times; 
 * 4. Criterion: stores the parameter set of fixed and changing categories; 
 * 5. Seller: Seller behavior 
 * 6. Spot Market: Buyers quantity competitive in the spot market; 
  * */ 
 
import java.io.FileNotFoundException;import java.io.FileOutputStream;import java.io.PrintStream;import 
java.text.DecimalFormat; 
import java.util.*;import tools.P; 
 
/* ******************Model Class*************************************/ 
public class ModelPSO { 
 static int parameterNo=1; 
 static boolean FixedRetailPrice=true;  
 static double Retailstd=0; 
 static int TotalbuyerNumber=1; 
 static int TotalsellerNumber=1; 
 static double Constraint=1;  
 static int EquilibriumNo=100;// run 100 times for each setup and calculate the mean and std for 
the results of all runs; 
 static int Evolution=500;//400 iterations of each run. with iterations, agents repeat the game and 
learn to use the optimal strategies under each setup; 
 static int ParallelMarket=10; 
 static int PSOTestNumber=3; 
 static int WeekPerCycle=1; 
 double variationloop=100; 
 static Random r=new Random(System.currentTimeMillis()*5986587); // identify random variable 
 
public static void main(String args[]) throws FileNotFoundException{ 
 double testprint=1; 
 FileOutputStream out,eout,aout,Pout, a2out, P2out, Sout; 
 PrintStream printOut,eprintOut,aprintOut,PprintOut, a2printOut,P2printOut, SprintOut; 
 
 // titles the output files 






         //Parameters 
        String Sname="PSO Parameter Sellers.txt"; Sout=new FileOutputStream(Sname); 
SprintOut=new PrintStream(Sout); 
  //4 buyer Actual Output 
   String aname="PSO for Buyer1.txt";aout=new FileOutputStream(aname); aprintOut=new 
PrintStream(aout); 
 //4 buyer Auction Parameters 
  String Pname="PSO parameters Buyer1.txt"; Pout=new FileOutputStream(Pname); 
PprintOut=new PrintStream(Pout); 
  String a2name="PSO for Buyer2.txt";a2out=new FileOutputStream(a2name); a2printOut=new 
PrintStream(a2out); 
  //4 buyer Auction Parameters 
  String P2name="PSO parameters Buyer2.txt"; P2out=new FileOutputStream(P2name); 
P2printOut=new PrintStream(P2out); 
 
/*******Initialization*********/     
  int    i,j,k,pi,fj;double tmpDouble;   
  // identify other classes except buyers and seller 
  ModelPSO m=new ModelPSO(); 
  RetailMarket bbm=new RetailMarket(m); 
  SpotMarket     dm=new SpotMarket(m); 
  PSOEquilibrium em=new PSOEquilibrium(m); 
  PSO PSO=new PSO(m); 
  Criterion cn=new Criterion(m); 
  // end of class identification 
  //set up template for one of the print outs 
  aprintOut.print("ChoiceV\tMarketP\tProbSold"); 
  a2printOut.print("ChoiceV\tMarketP\tProbSold"); 
  printOut.print("ResP\tMarketP\tProbSold"); 
  SprintOut.print("w\tc1\tc2\tReserveP\t"); 
  PprintOut.print("w\tc1\tc2\tMarketP\t"); 
  P2printOut.print("w\tc1\tc2\tMarketP\t"); 
  for(i=0;i<m.TotalbuyerNumber;i++){aprintOut.print("\t"+" 
Bid"+i+"\t\t"+"Profit"+i+"\t"); PprintOut.print(i+" BR\t");} 
  for(i=0;i<m.TotalbuyerNumber;i++){a2printOut.print("\t"+" 
Bid"+i+"\t\t"+"Profit"+i+"\t");P2printOut.print(i+" BR\t");} 
  for(i=0;i<m.TotalsellerNumber;i++){printOut.print("\tChoiceV"+i+"\t"+"Profit"+i+ "\t");




   
  //set up java output that is printed in the console 
  for(i=0;i<TotalbuyerNumber;i++){ 
   if(i==0) 
    P.t("\t==========buyer "+i+"============="); else 
P.t("\t============buyer "+i+"================"); 
   } 
  P.ln(); 
  for(i=0;i<TotalbuyerNumber;i++){ 
   if(i==0){P.t("\t  CR");P.t("Cbg\tClg "+"\tCgp-pr"+"\tClp-pr"+"\t Q"+"\t 
Cost"+"\tprofit");}  
   else {P.t("\t\t  CR");      
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   P.t(" Cbg\tClg "+"\tCp-pr"+"\t Cl-pr"+"\t Q"+"\t Cost"+"\tprofit");} 
  }// end of print commands  
  //CriterionNo is 4, this is looping the PSO criteria through four times.  
  // this makes the criteria the same for all buyers and sellers 
  for(int CN=0;CN<cn.CriterionNo;CN++){ 
   // this is identifying which parameter estimates to use for the model 
   // gets info from PSO class.  
   PSO.PSOParameterSetting(m,cn, 
CN,cn.MarketStructureFixed,cn.AlgorithmParameterFixed); 
  // loop that runs model 100 evolutions 
 for(int ec=0;ec<EquilibriumNo;ec++){ 
  if(ec==EquilibriumNo-1)P.t("\n Setting No. "+(CN+1)+" : Finish "+EquilibriumNo+" 
runs");     
  //class variables  
  bbm=new RetailMarket(m); 
  dm=new SpotMarket(m); 
  em=new PSOEquilibrium(m); 
  //establishes an array with number of buyers and sellers 
  AuctionBuyer1[] ab1 = new AuctionBuyer1[TotalbuyerNumber];AuctionBuyer2[] ab2 = 
new AuctionBuyer2[TotalbuyerNumber]; 
  Seller[] s=new Seller[TotalsellerNumber]; 
  // constructs a list with number of parallelMarkets 
  LinkedList[] sellerList=new LinkedList[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  LinkedList[] buyer1List=new LinkedList[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  LinkedList[] seller2List=new LinkedList[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  // constructs a list of parallel markets 
  Iterator[] sellerit=new Iterator[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Iterator[] buyerit=new Iterator[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Iterator[] seller2=new Iterator[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Seller seller;AuctionBuyer1 buyer1;AuctionBuyer2 buyer2; 
  // loops that fill the list of buyers and sellers 
  for(i=0;i<TotalbuyerNumber;i++)ab1[i]=new AuctionBuyer1(m,i);  
  for(i=0;i<TotalbuyerNumber;i++)ab2[i]=new AuctionBuyer2(m,i); 
  for(i=0;i<TotalsellerNumber;i++)s[i]=new Seller(m, dm, i); 
 
   /******************Begin Evolution ****************************/ 
                 /****************Begin Main Program*****************************/ 
  /**************Initialization *********************************/ 
  //start measuring solving time 
       long time; 
   em.EquilibriumInitial(); time=System.currentTimeMillis();  
   r=new Random(System.currentTimeMillis()*528789+ec*534757); 
  // starts the iterations or evolutions of trades 
  for(int e=-m.PSOTestNumber;e<m.Evolution;e++){  
  //updates parms for each evolution 
   PSO.UpdatePSOParameter(m, e, cn.AlgorithmParameterFixed); 
   
         /******For every parallel market, buyers and their clones trade simultaneously ************/ 
   // loop for each parallel markets are looped - during each evolution  
  for(int pm=0;pm<ParallelMarket;pm++){ 
  //creates a blank list of available buyers 
     LinkedList AvailableBuyerList=new LinkedList();  AvailableBuyerList.clear(); 
   
      //sets all the buyers to the initial values - calls from buyer 
  for(i=0;i<TotalbuyerNumber;i++){ 
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   ab1[i].EvolutionInitialization(m, bbm, em,PSO, e, 
pm);ab2[i].EvolutionInitialization(m, bbm, em,PSO, e, pm);//initialize} 
     
  for(i=0;i<TotalsellerNumber;i++){s[i].EvolutionInitialization(m, bbm, em,PSO, e, pm);} 
  //loop for week which is 1.  
  //Change weekpercycle to simulate multiple trades 
  for(int week=0;week<WeekPerCycle;week++){ 
  for(i=0;i<TotalbuyerNumber;i++){ 
  ab1[i].WeekInitialization(m,bbm,em,dm, e,pm);ab2[i].WeekInitialization(m,bbm,em,dm, 
e,pm); 
   //sets week values - called from buyer class  } 
  for(i=0;i<TotalsellerNumber;i++){ s[i].WeekInitialization(m,bbm,em,dm, e,pm); 
    //sets week values - called from buyer class } 
    
   // Auction Deal in Spot market 
  dm.AuctionDeal(ab1, ab2, s, m, week, pm); 
  dm.PreviousAverageBidPrice[pm]=dm.AverageBidPrice[pm]; //store market price; 
  dm.PreviousWinBidPrice[pm]=dm.WinBidPrice[pm]; 
  dm.PreviousAverageReservePrice[pm]=dm.AvgRandomRevserve[pm]; 
  for(i=0;i<ab1.length;i++)ab1[i].WeeklyProfit(m, dm, bbm, week, pm); // buyers' profit; 
  for(i=0;i<ab2.length;i++) ab2[i].WeeklyProfit(m, dm, bbm, week, pm); 
  for(i=0;i<s.length;i++) s[i].WeeklyProfit(m, dm, bbm, week, pm);}//end weeks; 
     
for(i=0;i<ab1.length;i++){ ab1[i].StorageParameter(m,pm);ab1[i].StoragePrevious(m, pm);//auction} 
for(i=0;i<ab2.length;i++){ ab2[i].StorageParameter(m,pm);ab2[i].StoragePrevious(m, pm);//auction} 
for(i=0;i<s.length;i++){s[i].StorageParameter(m,pm);s[i].StoragePrevious(m, pm);//auction} 
 }//end parallel market 
  
 //For buyers in auction 
 for(i=0;i<ab1.length;i++){ 




  //for the rest iterations, use PSO to select from best locals; 








  //for the rest iterations, use PSO to select from best locals; 
  else PSO.ChooseLearningParameterbuyer2(ab1, ab2[i], ab2, s, m, dm, bbm,em, PSO, e);
 } 
 
 //For buyers in auction 
 for(i=0;i<s.length;i++){ 




  //for the rest iterations, use PSO to select from best locals; 






















 for(i=0;i<m.TotalsellerNumber;i++) {   
printOut.print("\t\t"+tools.P.df1.format(s[i].r[0])+"\t"); 
printOut.print("\t"+tools.P.df1.format(s[i].WeeklyProfit[0][0])+"\t");} 
 }//end print 
 
 /******determine the market equilibrium******/  
em.EquilibriumStorageParameter(ab1, ab2,s, m, dm,e, parameterNo);  




 else em.EquilibriumEnd=m.Evolution; break;} 
 else continue;  
 }//end evolution; 
   
 /******calculate the running time of each round********/ 
cn.EquilibriumIteration[ec]=em.EquilibriumEnd; 
cn.EquilibriumTime[ec]=System.currentTimeMillis()-time; 







 }//end equilibrium; ec reached maximum 
   
 em.MeanDeviation(cn.EquilibriumIteration, cn.Iteration, 100, -
1);em.MeanDeviation(cn.EquilibriumTime, cn.Time, 100, -1); 
 em.MeanDeviation(cn.EquilibriumMarketBid1, cn.MarketBid1, 100, -1); 
 for(i=0;i<m.TotalbuyerNumber;i++)em.MeanDeviation(cn.EquilibriumBidRatio1[i], 
cn.CommonValueBid1[i], 200, -1); 










   
/******print the results when market reaches equilibrium******/  
  PprintOut.println("");P2printOut.println(""); SprintOut.println(""); 




   PprintOut.print("\t"); } 
  else 
if(cn.AlgorithmParameterFixed==true){PprintOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(PSO.w)+"\t");PprintOut.print(to
ols.P.df1.format(PSO.c1)+"\t"); 




  PprintOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(PSO.cup)+"\t");} 
  if(cn.MarketStructureFixed==false){ 
  P2printOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(m.ParallelMarket)+"\t"); 
P2printOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(m.PSOTestNumber)+"\t"); 
   P2printOut.print("\t");} 




  P2printOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(PSO.c2)+"\t");} 
  else{ 
  P2printOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(PSO.wup)+"\t");     
P2printOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(PSO.cup)+"\t"); 
  P2printOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(PSO.cup)+"\t"); } 
   
  if(cn.MarketStructureFixed==false){ 
  
 SprintOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(m.ParallelMarket)+"\t");SprintOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(m.P
SOTestNumber)+"\t");    SprintOut.print("\t");} 
  else if(cn.AlgorithmParameterFixed==true){ 
 
 SprintOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(PSO.w)+"\t");SprintOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(PSO.c1)+"\t"); 
  SprintOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(PSO.c2)+"\t");} 




  SprintOut.print(tools.P.df1.format(PSO.cup)+"\t");} 
   
  //*print out mean of market price, buyers' strategies, run time and iterations the program 

















































 }//end criterion   




/* ******************Buyer 1 Class**************************************************/ 
 
package PSOmpr;import java.util.*;import tools.*;import java.lang.*; 
public class AuctionBuyer1 { 
 Random r= new Random();Random s= new Random();Random rp = new Random(); 
    
 AuctionBuyer1(ModelPSO m,int id){ 
  ID=id;   
 cost0=m.BuyerCostParameter0;cost1=m.BuyerCostParameter1;cost2=m.BuyerCostParameter2; 
  PreviousBidRatio=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Bid =new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
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  PreviousBid1=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  CommonValueBid=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Quantity=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  PreviousQuantity=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  vector=new double[m.ParallelMarket][2];BestLocalParameter=new 
double[m.ParallelMarket][3];BestGlobalParameter=new double[3]; 
LocalParameter=new double[m.PSOTestNumber+1][m.ParallelMarket][3]; 
  Cost=new double[m.ParallelMarket];PreviousCost=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Profit=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  WeeklyProfit=new double[m.ParallelMarket][m.WeekPerCycle]; 
  PreviousProfit=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  CommonValue=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  PercentQuantity=new double[m.ParallelMarket];} 
    
  int ID;double[] Cost; double[] PreviousCost;double cost0, cost1, cost2; 
  double [][]BestLocalParameter;double[] BestGlobalParameter; double[][][] 
LocalParameter;double[][] vector; 
  double[] PreviousBidRatio; 
  double[] Bid; 
  double[] Quantity; 
  double[] PreviousQuantity; 
  double[][] WeeklyProfit; double[] Profit;double[] PreviousProfit; 
  double[] PercentQuantity; 
  boolean[] PutBid; 
      
  void EvolutionInitialization(ModelPSO m, RetailMarket bbm, PSOEquilibrium em, PSO 
PSO, int e, int pm) { 
  for(int i=0;i<m.WeekPerCycle;i++) WeeklyProfit[pm][i]=0; 
  CommonValueBid(m, PSO, e, pm); } 
       
  void WeekInitialization(ModelPSO m, RetailMarket bbm, PSOEquilibrium em, 
SpotMarket dm,int e, int pm){ 
  Bid(m, em, dm, e, pm); Quantity[pm]=0; Profit[pm]=0;  
} // end of weekinitialization 
   
  void CommonValueBid(ModelPSO m, PSO PSO, int e, int pm){    
  // this is for the first 20 trades when values are initialized  
  if(e<0){ CommonValueBid[pm]=0.2+0.3*Math.random();  
   
 LocalParameter[e+m.PSOTestNumber][pm][2]=0.2+0.3*Math.random(); 
    BestGlobalParameter[2]=0.2+0.3*Math.random(); 
   
 BestLocalParameter[pm][2]=LocalParameter[e+m.PSOTestNumber][pm][2]; 
    return; }// after that e > 0 
  // velocity 
vector[pm][1]=PSO.w*vector[pm][1]+PSO.c1*m.r.nextDouble()*(BestLocalParameter[pm][2]-
PreviousBidRatio[pm])+PSO.c2*m.r.nextDouble()*(BestGlobalParameter[2]-PreviousBidRatio[pm]);  
  // bid stragety 
  CommonValueBid[pm]=vector[pm][1]+PreviousBidRatio[pm]; 
   if(CommonValueBid[pm]> 1){   CommonValueBid[pm]=1;     } 
   else if(CommonValueBid[pm]<-1){   CommonValueBid[pm]=-1;   } 
   vector[pm][1]=CommonValueBid[pm]-PreviousBidRatio[pm]; 
  } // end of BidStrategy 
 
  void Bid(ModelPSO m, PSOEquilibrium em, SpotMarket dm, int e, int pm){ 
   Bid[pm]=CommonValueBid[pm]; 
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  } // end of Bid 
     
  void WeeklyProfit(ModelPSO m, SpotMarket dm, RetailMarket bbm, int week, int pm){ 
   WeeklyProfit[pm][week]=dm.Eprofit1[pm];     
  } // end of Profit 
   
  void StorageParameter(ModelPSO m, int pm){ 
   double profitC=0;int week;double count=0; 
      if(m.WeekPerCycle>1)week=1;else week=0; 
   for(int i=week;i<m.WeekPerCycle;i++){ 
   profitC+=WeeklyProfit[pm][i];count++;} 
   profitC=profitC/count;Profit[pm]=WeeklyProfit[pm][week];    
  } // end of Storage Parameter 
   
  void StoragePrevious(ModelPSO m, int pm){ 
    PreviousBidRatio[pm]= CommonValueBid[pm]; PreviousBid1[pm]=Bid[pm]; 
PreviousQuantity[pm]= Quantity[pm]; 
        PreviousProfit[pm]=Profit[pm]; PreviousCost[pm]= Cost[pm];  
  
  } // end of StoragePrevious  
  
} // end of BuyerAuction1 
 
 
/* ******************Buyer 2 Class**************************************************/ 
package PSOmpr;import java.util.*;import tools.*;import java.lang.*; 
public class AuctionBuyer2 { 
 Random r= new Random();Random s= new Random();Random rp = new Random(); 
   
 AuctionBuyer2(ModelPSO m,int id){ 
ID=id;cost0=m.BuyerCostParameter0;cost1=m.BuyerCostParameter1; 
  PreviousBidRatio=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Bid =new double[m.ParallelMarket];PreviousBid=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  TempBid= new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  CommonValueBid=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Quantity=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  PreviousQuantity=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  vector=new double[m.ParallelMarket][2]; 
  BestLocalParameter=new double[m.ParallelMarket][3];BestGlobalParameter=new 
double[3]; 
  LocalParameter=new double[m.PSOTestNumber+1][m.ParallelMarket][3]; 
  Cost=new double[m.ParallelMarket];PreviousCost=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Profit=new double[m.ParallelMarket];WeeklyProfit=new 
double[m.ParallelMarket][m.WeekPerCycle]; 
  PreviousProfit=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  PercentQuantity=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
 } 
  int ID;double[] Cost; double[] PreviousCost;double cost0, cost1, cost2;double 
[][]BestLocalParameter; 
  double[] BestGlobalParameter;double[][][] LocalParameter; double[][] vector; 
  double[] PreviousBidRatio; 
  double[] Bid;double[] PreviousBid; 
  double[] Quantity;double[] PreviousQuantity; 
  double[][] WeeklyProfit; double[] Profit;double[] PreviousProfit; 
  double[] PercentQuantity; 
  boolean[] PutBid; 
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 void EvolutionInitialization(ModelPSO m, RetailMarket bbm, PSOEquilibrium em, PSO PSO, int 
e, int pm) { 
   for(int i=0;i<m.WeekPerCycle;i++)  WeeklyProfit[pm][i]=0; 
   CommonValueBid(m, PSO, e, pm); 
 } 
       
 void WeekInitialization(ModelPSO m, RetailMarket bbm, PSOEquilibrium em, SpotMarket 
dm,int e, int pm){ 
   Bid(m, em, dm, e, pm); Quantity[pm]=0; Profit[pm]=0;   
 } // end of weekinitialization 
   
 void CommonValueBid(ModelPSO m, PSO PSO, int e, int pm){ 
  // this is for the first 20 trades when values are initialized  
   if(e<0){ CommonValueBid[pm]=0.2+0.3*Math.random();  
   
 LocalParameter[e+m.PSOTestNumber][pm][2]=0.2+0.3*Math.random(); 
    BestGlobalParameter[2]=0.2+0.3*Math.random(); 
   
 BestLocalParameter[pm][2]=LocalParameter[e+m.PSOTestNumber][pm][2]; 
    return; }// after that e > 0 
  // velocity 
vector[pm][1]=PSO.w*vector[pm][1]+PSO.c1*m.r.nextDouble()*(BestLocalParameter[pm][2]-
PreviousBidRatio[pm])+PSO.c2*m.r.nextDouble()*(BestGlobalParameter[2]-PreviousBidRatio[pm]);  
  // bid stragety 
    CommonValueBid[pm]=vector[pm][1]+PreviousBidRatio[pm]; 
     if(CommonValueBid[pm]>1){   CommonValueBid[pm]=1;   } 
    else if(CommonValueBid[pm]<-1){  CommonValueBid[pm]=-1;   } 
    vector[pm][1]=CommonValueBid[pm]-PreviousBidRatio[pm];    
 } // end of BidStrategy 
 
 void Bid(ModelPSO m, PSOEquilibrium em, SpotMarket dm, int e, int pm){ 
   Bid[pm]=CommonValueBid[pm];//Math.max(CommonValueBid[pm], 
dm.information);   
 } // end of Bid 
     
 void WeeklyProfit(ModelPSO m, SpotMarket dm, RetailMarket bbm, int week, int pm){ 
   WeeklyProfit[pm][week]=dm.Eprofit2[pm];    
 } // end of Profit 
   
 void StorageParameter(ModelPSO m, int pm){ 
   double profitC=0;int week;double count=0; 
      if(m.WeekPerCycle>1)week=1;else week=0; 
   for(int i=week;i<m.WeekPerCycle;i++){ 
   profitC+=WeeklyProfit[pm][i];count++;} 
   profitC=profitC/count;Profit[pm]=WeeklyProfit[pm][week];    
 } // end of Storage Parameter 
   
 void StoragePrevious(ModelPSO m, int pm){ 
    PreviousBidRatio[pm]= CommonValueBid[pm]; PreviousBid[pm]=Bid[pm]; 
PreviousQuantity[pm]= Quantity[pm]; 
        PreviousProfit[pm]=Profit[pm]; PreviousCost[pm]= Cost[pm];  
  
 } // end of StoragePrevious 
   





/* ******************Seller Class**************************************************/ 
package PSOmpr;import java.util.*;import tools.P; 
public class Seller { 
 Random s= new Random(); 
 Seller(ModelPSO m,SpotMarket dm,int id){   
  ID=id; 
  PreviousBidRatio=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  r =new double[m.ParallelMarket]; PreviousBid=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  ReservePrice=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Quantity=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  PreviousQuantity=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  vector=new double[m.ParallelMarket][2]; 
  BestLocalParameter=new double[m.ParallelMarket][3];BestGlobalParameter=new 
double[3]; 
  LocalParameter=new double[m.PSOTestNumber+1][m.ParallelMarket][3]; 
  Cost=new double[m.ParallelMarket];PreviousCost=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Profit=new double[m.ParallelMarket];WeeklyProfit=new 
double[m.ParallelMarket][m.WeekPerCycle]; 
  PreviousProfit=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
 } 
    
  int ID;double[] Cost; double[] PreviousCost;double cost0, cost1, cost2; 
  double [][]BestLocalParameter;double[] BestGlobalParameter;double[][][] 
LocalParameter;double[][] vector; 
  double[] PreviousBidRatio; 
  double[] r;double[] PreviousBid; 
  double[] ReservePrice; 
  double[] Quantity;double[] PreviousQuantity; 
  double[][] WeeklyProfit; double[] Profit;double[] PreviousProfit; 
  double[] PercentQuantity; 
  boolean[] PutBid; 
   
  void EvolutionInitialization(ModelPSO m, RetailMarket bbm, PSOEquilibrium em, PSO 
PSO, int e, int pm) { 
   for(int i=0;i<m.WeekPerCycle;i++) WeeklyProfit[pm][i]=0;    
   ReservePrice(m, PSO, e, pm); 
  } 
       
  void WeekInitialization(ModelPSO m, RetailMarket bbm, PSOEquilibrium em, 
SpotMarket dm,int e, int pm){ 
   R(m, em, dm, e, pm);Quantity[pm]=0;Profit[pm]=0;    
  
  } // end of weekinitialization 
   
  void ReservePrice(ModelPSO m, PSO PSO, int e, int pm){ 
   // this is for the first 20 trades when values are initialized  
   if(e<0){ReservePrice[pm]=0.2+0.3*Math.random();  
   
 LocalParameter[e+m.PSOTestNumber][pm][2]=0.2+0.3*Math.random(); 
    BestGlobalParameter[2]=0.2+0.3*Math.random(); 
   
 BestLocalParameter[pm][2]=LocalParameter[e+m.PSOTestNumber][pm][2]; 
    return;}// after that e > 0 





  // bid stragety 
  ReservePrice[pm]=vector[pm][1]+PreviousBidRatio[pm]; 
     if(ReservePrice[pm]>1){   ReservePrice[pm]=1;  } 
    else if(ReservePrice[pm]<-1){  ReservePrice[pm]=-1;   } 
   vector[pm][1]=ReservePrice[pm]-PreviousBidRatio[pm];    
  } // end of BidStrategy 
 
  void R(ModelPSO m, PSOEquilibrium em, SpotMarket dm, int e, int pm){ 
     r[pm]=ReservePrice[pm]; 
} // end of Bid 
     
  void WeeklyProfit(ModelPSO m, SpotMarket dm, RetailMarket bbm, int week, int pm){ 
   WeeklyProfit[pm][week]=dm.SellerEprofit[pm];    
  } // end of Profit 
   
  void StorageParameter(ModelPSO m, int pm){ 
   double profitC=0;int week;double count=0; 
      if(m.WeekPerCycle>1)week=1;else week=0; 
   for(int i=week;i<m.WeekPerCycle;i++){ 
   profitC+=WeeklyProfit[pm][i];count++;} 
   profitC=profitC/count; Profit[pm]=profitC;    
  } // end of Storage Parameter   
   
  void StoragePrevious(ModelPSO m, int pm){ 
   PreviousBidRatio[pm]= ReservePrice[pm];  PreviousBid[pm]=r[pm];  
PreviousQuantity[pm]= Quantity[pm]; 
       PreviousProfit[pm]=Profit[pm]; PreviousCost[pm]= Cost[pm]; 
 } // end of StoragePrevious 
} // end of Seller 
 
 
/* ******************Auction Market 
Class**************************************************/ 
package PSOmpr;import java.util.*;import tools.*; 
 
public class AuctionMarket { 
 double Distribution;  
 double PreviousAveragePrice[]; 
 double AveragePrice[]; 
 double Prob[];double Prob1[];double Prob2[]; double P1[];double P2[]; 
 double Eprofit1[];double Eprofit2[]; 
 double TempEprofit1[];double TempEprofit2[]; 
 double AverageBidPrice[];double AverageBidPrice1[];double AverageBidPrice2[]; 
 double PreviousWinBidPrice[]; 
 double TotalAverageBidPrice[];double TempAverageBidPrice[]; 
 double PreviousAverageBidPrice[]; 
 double PreviousAverageReservePrice[]; 
 double TempBid1[];double TempBid2[]; 
 double RandomBid1[];double RandomBid2[]; 
 double TempRandomBid1[];double TempRandomBid2[]; 
 double SumRandomBid1[];double SumRandomBid2[];double SumRandomReserve[]; 
 double TotalProfit[];double AverageProfit[]; 
 double TotalReserve[];double AverageReserve[];double RandomAverageReserve[]; 
 double TempRandomAverageReserve[]; 
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 double SellerEprofit[];double SellerEprofit1[];double SellerEprofit2[]; 
 double TotalBid1[];double TotalBid2[]; 
 double AvgRandomRevserve[]; 
 double TotalSold[];double TempTotalSold[]; 
 double Factor1[];double Factor2[]; 
 double WinBidPrice[]; 
   
 SpotMarket(ModelPSO m){ 
  AveragePrice=new double[m.ParallelMarket] ; 
  WinBidPrice=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  PreviousAveragePrice=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  TotalQuantity1=new double[m.ParallelMarket];TotalQuantity2=new 
double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Prob=new double[m.ParallelMarket];Prob1=new double[m.ParallelMarket];Prob2=new 
double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Eprofit1=new double[m.ParallelMarket];Eprofit2=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  TempEprofit1=new double[m.ParallelMarket];TempEprofit2=new 
double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  AverageBidPrice=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  AverageBidPrice1=new double[m.ParallelMarket];AverageBidPrice2=new 
double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  SumRandomReserve=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  PreviousWinBidPrice=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  PreviousAverageBidPrice=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  PreviousAverageReservePrice=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  TempBid1=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; TempBid2=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  RandomBid1=new double[m.ParallelMarket];RandomBid2=new 
double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  TempRandomBid1=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; TempRandomBid2=new 
double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  SumRandomBid1=new double[m.ParallelMarket];SumRandomBid2=new 
double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  TotalProfit=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  AverageProfit=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  TotalReserve=new double[m.ParallelMarket];AverageReserve=new 
double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  RandomAverageReserve=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  SellerEprofit= new double [m.ParallelMarket];SellerEprofit1= new double 
[m.ParallelMarket];SellerEprofit2= new double [m.ParallelMarket]; 
  TempRandomAverageReserve=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  TempSellerEprofit=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  TempAverageBidPrice=new double[m.ParallelMarket];TotalAverageBidPrice=new 
double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  TotalBid1=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; TotalBid2=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  AvgRandomRevserve=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  TotalSold=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; TempTotalSold=new 
double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  Factor1=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; Factor2=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
  P1=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; P2=new double[m.ParallelMarket]; 
 } 
  
 void DirectMarketInitialzation(ModelPSO m,AuctionBuyer1[] p, Seller[] f){ 





public void AuctionDeal(AuctionBuyer1[] ab1, AuctionBuyer2[] ab2, Seller[] s, ModelPSO m, int week, 
int pm){ 
 TotalReserve[pm]=0;TotalBid1[pm]=0;TotalBid2[pm]=0; 
 for(int t=0;t<ab1.length;t++){TotalBid1[pm]=ab1[0].Bid[pm];// choice variable} 
 for(int t=0;t<ab2.length;t++){TotalBid2[pm]=ab2[0].Bid[pm];//choice variable [0,1]} 
 for(int t=0;t<s.length;t++){TotalReserve[pm]=s[0].r[pm];} 
 AverageReserve[pm]=TotalReserve[pm]/m.TotalsellerNumber; 
 






//Loop with the Stochastic Reserve Price  
for(double c3=0; c3<=Distribution;c3++){ 
if(c3!=0 && c3!=Distribution)Factor1[pm]=1/Distribution; 
else Factor1[pm]=(1/Distribution)/2; 
RandomAverageReserve[pm]=AverageReserve[pm]-c3/m.variationloop; 
 for(double c1=0;c1<=m.variationloop;c1++){ 
  if(c1!=0 && c1!=m.variationloop)Factor2[pm]=1/m.variationloop; 
  else Factor2[pm]=.5/m.variationloop;   
  Prob2[pm]=0;Prob1[pm]=0; 
  TempRandomBid1[pm]=0;TempRandomBid2[pm]=0; 
  RandomBid1[pm]=TotalBid1[pm]-c1/m.variationloop ; 
  RandomBid2[pm]=TotalBid2[pm]-c1/m.variationloop ; 
   
  // Inside loop bidder 2 
  for(double c2=0;c2<=m.variationloop;c2++){ 
   if(c2!=0 && c2!=m.variationloop)Prob[pm]=1/m.variationloop; 
   else Prob[pm]=(1/m.variationloop)/2; 
   
  TempRandomBid2[pm]=TotalBid2[pm]-c2/m.variationloop;  
  if(RandomBid1[pm]>TempRandomBid2[pm] && 
RandomBid1[pm]>=RandomAverageReserve[pm])Prob1[pm]=Prob1[pm]+(Prob[pm])*Factor2[pm]; 
  else if(RandomBid1[pm]==TempRandomBid2[pm] && 
RandomBid1[pm]>=RandomAverageReserve[pm])Prob1[pm]=Prob1[pm]+(Prob[pm]/2)*Factor2[pm]; 
   
  TempRandomBid1[pm]=TotalBid1[pm]-c2/m.variationloop;  
  if(RandomBid2[pm]>TempRandomBid1[pm] && 
RandomBid2[pm]>=RandomAverageReserve[pm])Prob2[pm]=Prob2[pm]+(Prob[pm])*Factor2[pm]; 
  else if(RandomBid2[pm]==TempRandomBid1[pm] && 
RandomBid2[pm]>=RandomAverageReserve[pm])Prob2[pm]=Prob2[pm]+(Prob[pm]/2)*Factor2[pm];  











 SumRandomReserve[pm]+=RandomAverageReserve[pm];  











}//end of AuctionDeal 
}// end of auction market 
 
 
/* ******************PSO algorithm **************************************************/ 
package PSOmpr;import java.util.*; 
public class PSO { 
 double w=.4,c1=1,c2=1;//w=0.98,c1=2,c2=2;double wup,cup;int Converge=0; 
  
    PSO(ModelPSO m){Converge=m.Evolution;} 
  
 void UpdatePSOParameter(ModelPSO m, int e,boolean Fixed){ 
  if(Fixed==true)return; 
  else{ 
  if(e<0)e+=m.PSOTestNumber;   
  w=wup*(double)Math.max(0,(this.Converge-e))/(double)this.Converge; 
  c1=cup*(double)Math.max(0,(this.Converge-e))/(double)this.Converge; //local 
  c2=c1;//global} 
 } 
  
void PSOParameterSetting(ModelPSO m,Criterion cn,int CN,boolean 
MarketStructureFixed,boolean AlgorithmParameterFixed){ 
  if(MarketStructureFixed==false){ 
   m.ParallelMarket=cn.pm[CN];m.PSOTestNumber=cn.localTest[CN];  
   if(AlgorithmParameterFixed==true){ 
    w=.4;c1=1;c2=1; } 
    else{wup=.5; cup=1;Converge=400;}   
  } 
  else if(AlgorithmParameterFixed==true){w=cn.w[CN];   c1=cn.c1[CN];   
c2=cn.c2[CN];} 
  else{wup=cn.wup[CN];cup=cn.cup[CN];Converge=cn.Converge[CN];}   
 } 
  
 //Choose PSO learning parameter: best local & best global; 
 //Choose PSO learning parameter: best local & best global for Auction ; 
void ChooseLearningParameterbuyer1(AuctionBuyer1 buyer1, AuctionBuyer1[] ab1,  
AuctionBuyer2[] ab2,Seller[] s,ModelPSO m,SpotMarket dm,RetailMarket bbm,PSOEquilibrium em,PSO 
PSO,int e){ 
   int count=0; 
   double LocalListAuction[][][]=new 
double[m.PSOTestNumber+1][m.ParallelMarket][3];//[0:parameter][1:capacity parameter] 
   //initial     
   for(int pm=0;pm<m.ParallelMarket;pm++){     
    buyer1.BestLocalParameter[pm][0]=-2000000000;   
   





    }  
     
    for(int pm=0;pm<m.ParallelMarket;pm++){ 
     count=0; 
     for(int ev=0;ev<m.PSOTestNumber;ev++){ 
     boolean same=false;  
     for(int kk=0;kk<count;kk++){ 
     
 if(buyer1.LocalParameter[ev][pm][2]==LocalListAuction[kk][pm][2]){same=true;break;} 
     } 
     if (same==false)
 {LocalListAuction[count][pm][2]=buyer1.LocalParameter[ev][pm][2]; count++;} 
     }  
    
 LocalListAuction[count][pm][2]=buyer1.PreviousBidRatio[pm];count++; 
    }  
     
    for(int pm=0;pm<m.ParallelMarket;pm++){ 
       LinkedList AvailablebuyersList=new LinkedList(); 
AvailablebuyersList.clear();count=0; 
         
    while(LocalListAuction[count][pm][2]>=-1) {  
      LocalListAuction[count][pm][0]=0; 
     
 buyer1.CommonValueBid[pm]=LocalListAuction[count][pm][2];buyer1.Bid(m, em,dm, e,pm); 
      for(int i=0;i<ab1.length;i++){   
     
       
 if(ab1[i].ID!=buyer1.ID)ab1[i].CommonValueBid[pm]=ab1[i].PreviousBidRatio[pm]; } 
      for(int week=0;week<m.WeekPerCycle;week++){  
       for(int 
i=0;i<ab1.length;i++){ab1[i].WeekInitialization(m,bbm,em,dm, e,pm);} 
       dm.AuctionDeal(ab1, ab2, s, m, week, pm); 
       buyer1.WeeklyProfit(m, dm, bbm, week, 
pm); 
     }//end weeks; 
    
 buyer1.StorageParameter(m,pm);LocalListAuction[count][pm][0]+=buyer1.Profit[pm]; 
     if((LocalListAuction[count][pm][0]-
buyer1.BestLocalParameter[pm][0])>=-1){ 
     
 buyer1.BestLocalParameter[pm][2]=buyer1.CommonValueBid[pm]; 
     
 buyer1.BestLocalParameter[pm][0]=LocalListAuction[count][pm][0]; } 
      count++; 
      if(count>=m.PSOTestNumber)break; 
      } 
     for(int 
i=0;i<m.PSOTestNumber;i++){buyer1.LocalParameter[i][pm][2]=buyer1.LocalParameter[i+1][pm][2];}  
    
 buyer1.LocalParameter[m.PSOTestNumber][pm][2]=buyer1.BestLocalParameter[pm][2]; 
    }//end pm; 
    TestGlobalParameterTradeAuction1(buyer1, ab1,  
ab2,s,m,dm,bbm,PSO,e); 




 //Choose PSO learning parameter: best local & best global; 
 //Choose PSO learning parameter: best local & best global for Auction ; 
void ChooseLearningParameterbuyer2( AuctionBuyer1[] ab1, AuctionBuyer2 buyer2, 
AuctionBuyer2[] ab2,Seller[] s,ModelPSO m,SpotMarket dm,RetailMarket bbm,PSOEquilibrium em,PSO 
PSO,int e){ 
   int count=0; 
   double LocalListAuction2[][][]=new 
double[m.PSOTestNumber+1][m.ParallelMarket][3];//[0:parameter][1:capacity parameter] 
    //initial 
   for(int pm=0;pm<m.ParallelMarket;pm++){ 
     buyer2.BestLocalParameter[pm][0]=-2000000000; 
     for(count=0;count<m.PSOTestNumber+1;count++){ 
LocalListAuction2[count][pm][1]=-
1;LocalListAuction2[count][pm][2]=-1;}    
    }  
     
    for(int pm=0;pm<m.ParallelMarket;pm++){ 
     count=0; 
     for(int ev=0;ev<m.PSOTestNumber;ev++){ 
     boolean same=false;  
     for(int kk=0;kk<count;kk++){ 
     
 if(buyer2.LocalParameter[ev][pm][2]==LocalListAuction2[kk][pm][2]){same=true;break;} 
     } 
     if (same==false){
 LocalListAuction2[count][pm][2]=buyer2.LocalParameter[ev][pm][2]; 
      count++;} 
     }  
    
 LocalListAuction2[count][pm][2]=buyer2.PreviousBidRatio[pm];count++;}  
     
    for(int pm=0;pm<m.ParallelMarket;pm++){ 
        LinkedList AvailablebuyersList=new LinkedList();   
AvailablebuyersList.clear();count=0; 
     while(LocalListAuction2[count][pm][2]>=-1) {  
      LocalListAuction2[count][pm][0]=0; 
     
 buyer2.CommonValueBid[pm]=LocalListAuction2[count][pm][2]; 
      buyer2.Bid(m, em,dm, e,pm); 
      for(int i=0;i<ab2.length;i++){   
            
 if(ab2[i].ID!=buyer2.ID)ab2[i].CommonValueBid[pm]=ab2[i].PreviousBidRatio[pm]; } 
 
     for(int week=0;week<m.WeekPerCycle;week++){  
     for(int 
i=0;i<ab2.length;i++)ab2[i].WeekInitialization(m,bbm,em,dm, e,pm); 
       dm.AuctionDeal(ab1, ab2, s, m, week, pm); 
       buyer2.WeeklyProfit(m, dm, bbm, week, 
pm); 
      }//end weeks; 
      buyer2.StorageParameter(m,pm); 
     
 LocalListAuction2[count][pm][0]+=buyer2.Profit[pm]; 




      
 buyer2.BestLocalParameter[pm][2]=buyer2.CommonValueBid[pm]; 
      
 buyer2.BestLocalParameter[pm][0]=LocalListAuction2[count][pm][0]; } 
      count++;if(count>=m.PSOTestNumber)break;} 
      
     for(int 
i=0;i<m.PSOTestNumber;i++){buyer2.LocalParameter[i][pm][2]=buyer2.LocalParameter[i+1][pm][2];}  
    
 buyer2.LocalParameter[m.PSOTestNumber][pm][2]=buyer2.BestLocalParameter[pm][2]; 
    }//end pm; 
   TestGlobalParameterTradeAuction2(ab1, buyer2, ab2,s,m,dm,bbm,PSO,e); 
   
   } 
  
void ChooseLearningParameterseller(AuctionBuyer1[] ab1, AuctionBuyer2[] ab2,Seller seller,  
Seller[] s,ModelPSO m,SpotMarket dm,RetailMarket bbm,PSOEquilibrium em,PSO PSO,int e){ 
  int count=0;double LocalListSeller[][][]=new 
double[m.PSOTestNumber+1][m.ParallelMarket][3]; 
  //initial 
  for(int pm=0;pm<m.ParallelMarket;pm++){ 
   seller.BestLocalParameter[pm][0]=-2000000000; 
  
 for(count=0;count<m.PSOTestNumber+1;count++){LocalListSeller[count][pm][1]=-1;      
LocalListSeller[count][pm][2]=-1; }  
  }  
   
  for(int pm=0;pm<m.ParallelMarket;pm++){   
   count=0; 
   for(int ev=0;ev<m.PSOTestNumber;ev++){ 
   boolean same=false;     
   for(int kk=0;kk<count;kk++){ 
   
 if(seller.LocalParameter[ev][pm][2]==LocalListSeller[kk][pm][2]){same=true;break;}} 
   if (same==false){
 LocalListSeller[count][pm][2]=seller.LocalParameter[ev][pm][2];count++;}}  
   LocalListSeller[count][pm][2]=seller.PreviousBidRatio[pm]; count++;} 
  
   
  for(int pm=0;pm<m.ParallelMarket;pm++){ 
      LinkedList AvailablesellerList=new LinkedList();  AvailablesellerList.clear();
 count=0; 
   while(LocalListSeller[count][pm][2]>=-1) {  
   
 LocalListSeller[count][pm][0]=0;seller.ReservePrice[pm]=LocalListSeller[count][pm][2];seller.R(
m, em,dm, e,pm);      for(int 
i=0;i<s.length;i++){if(s[i].ID!=seller.ID)s[i].ReservePrice[pm]=s[i].PreviousBidRatio[pm]; } 
 
    for(int week=0;week<m.WeekPerCycle;week++){  
     for(int 
i=0;i<s.length;i++)s[i].WeekInitialization(m,bbm,em,dm, e,pm);   
     dm.AuctionDeal(ab1, ab2, s, m, week, pm);
 seller.WeeklyProfit(m, dm, bbm, week, pm); 
    }//end weeks; 




     
    if((LocalListSeller[count][pm][0]-
seller.BestLocalParameter[pm][0])>=-1){ 
     seller.BestLocalParameter[pm][2]=seller.ReservePrice[pm]; 
seller.BestLocalParameter[pm][0]=LocalListSeller[count][pm]
[0];} 
    count++; 
    if(count>=m.PSOTestNumber)break; 
    } 
   for(int 
i=0;i<m.PSOTestNumber;i++){seller.LocalParameter[i][pm][2]=seller.LocalParameter[i+1][pm][2];
 }  
  
 seller.LocalParameter[m.PSOTestNumber][pm][2]=seller.BestLocalParameter[pm][2]; 
   }//end pm;   
  TestGlobalParameterTradeSeller(ab1, ab2, seller, s,m,dm,bbm,PSO,e); 
} 
 
//Choose PSO learning parameter: best local & best global; 
void TestGlobalParameterTradeAuction1(AuctionBuyer1 buyer1, AuctionBuyer1[] ab1, AuctionBuyer2[] 
ab2,Seller[] s,ModelPSO m, SpotMarket dm,RetailMarket bbm,PSO PSO,int e){ 
 //use the best instead of average of local as global 
 buyer1.BestGlobalParameter[0]=-2000000;  
    for(int pm=0;pm<m.ParallelMarket;pm++){ 
     if(buyer1.BestLocalParameter[pm][0]>buyer1.BestGlobalParameter[0]){ 
      buyer1.BestGlobalParameter[0]=buyer1.BestLocalParameter[pm][0]; 
      buyer1.BestGlobalParameter[2]=buyer1.BestLocalParameter[pm][2];    } 
    }  
} 
 
void TestGlobalParameterTradeAuction2(AuctionBuyer1[] ab1, AuctionBuyer2 buyer2, AuctionBuyer2[] 
ab2,Seller[] s,ModelPSO m, SpotMarket dm,RetailMarket bbm,PSO PSO,int e){ 
 //use the best instead of average of local as global 
  buyer2.BestGlobalParameter[0]=-2000000; 
 for(int pm=0;pm<m.ParallelMarket;pm++){ 
     if(buyer2.BestLocalParameter[pm][0]>buyer2.BestGlobalParameter[0]){ 
      buyer2.BestGlobalParameter[0]=buyer2.BestLocalParameter[pm][0]; 
      buyer2.BestGlobalParameter[2]=buyer2.BestLocalParameter[pm][2];    } 
        }  
} 
 
void TestGlobalParameterTradeSeller(AuctionBuyer1[] ab1, AuctionBuyer2[] ab2,Seller seller, Seller[] 
s,ModelPSO m, SpotMarket dm,RetailMarket bbm,PSO PSO,int e){ 
 //use the best instead of average of local as global 
 seller.BestGlobalParameter[0]=-2000000; 
  
    for(int pm=0;pm<m.ParallelMarket;pm++){ 
     if(seller.BestLocalParameter[pm][0]>seller.BestGlobalParameter[0]){ 
      seller.BestGlobalParameter[0]=seller.BestLocalParameter[pm][0]; 
      seller.BestGlobalParameter[2]=seller.BestLocalParameter[pm][2];   } 
    }  
} 
 







package PSOmpr;import java.util.*;import tools.P; 
public class PSOEquilibrium { 
 int   CriterionPerSet=5; 
 double JudgeDevCR[]={0.0000001,0.000000001}; 
 int EquilibriumEnd=0; 
 boolean  JudgeEquilibrium; 
 double[]    rTemp; 
 double[]    MarketBidTemp1;double[] MarketBid1; 
 double[]    MarketBidTemp2;double[] MarketBid2; 
 double[] ReserveRandom; 
 double[][]  CapacityRatio; 
 double[][]  CommonValueBidTemp1;double[][] CommonValueBidTemp2; 
 double[][] ReserveTemp;double[][] Reserve; 
 double[][] BidPriceTemp; 
 double     convergeTime; 
 double[][] CommonValueBid1;double[][] CommonValueBid2; 
  
 PSOEquilibrium(ModelPSO m){ 
  rTemp=new double[CriterionPerSet]; 
  MarketBidTemp1=new double[CriterionPerSet]; 
  MarketBid1=new double[CriterionPerSet]; 
  MarketBid2=new double[CriterionPerSet]; 
  ReserveRandom=new double[CriterionPerSet]; 
  MarketBidTemp2=new double[CriterionPerSet]; 
  CapacityRatio=new double[m.TotalbuyerNumber][2]; 
  CommonValueBid1=new double [m.TotalbuyerNumber][2]; 
  CommonValueBid2=new double [m.TotalbuyerNumber][2]; 
  CommonValueBidTemp1=new double[m.TotalbuyerNumber][CriterionPerSet]; 
  CommonValueBidTemp2=new double[m.TotalbuyerNumber][CriterionPerSet]; 
  ReserveTemp=new double[m.TotalsellerNumber][CriterionPerSet]; 
  Reserve=new double[m.TotalsellerNumber][CriterionPerSet]; 
  //use mean value to determine the criteria                                            
 } 
  
 void EquilibriumInitial(){ convergeTime=0;JudgeEquilibrium=false;} 
//Buyer 1 
void EquilibriumStorageParameter(AuctionBuyer1[] ab1,AuctionBuyer2[] ab2, Seller[] s, ModelPSO 
m,SpotMarket dm,int e,int parameterNo){ 




   rTemp[e]=dm.PreviousAverageReservePrice[0]; 
   for(int 
i=0;i<ab1.length;i++)CommonValueBidTemp1[i][e]=ab1[i].PreviousBidRatio[0]; 
   for(int 
i=0;i<ab2.length;i++)CommonValueBidTemp2[i][e]=ab2[i].PreviousBidRatio[0]; 
   for(int i=0;i<s.length;i++)ReserveTemp[i][e]=s[i].PreviousBidRatio[0]; 
   }//;if evolutionary iteration No. is less than CriterionNo, only store the market 
price and buyers' strategies of one selected market; 
   
  else{ 







  rTemp[k]=rTemp[k+1];rTemp[CriterionPerSet-1]=dm.AvgRandomRevserve[0]; } 
  for(int i=0;i<ab1.length;i++){ 
  for(int k=0;k<CriterionPerSet-
1;k++)CommonValueBidTemp1[i][k]=CommonValueBidTemp1[i][k+1]; 
   CommonValueBidTemp1[i][CriterionPerSet-1]=ab1[i].PreviousBidRatio[0]; 
  }//;storage buyersacution' strategy parameters of selected market;*/; 
   
  for(int i=0;i<ab2.length;i++){ 
  for(int k=0;k<CriterionPerSet-
1;k++)CommonValueBidTemp2[i][k]=CommonValueBidTemp2[i][k+1]; 
   CommonValueBidTemp2[i][CriterionPerSet-1]=ab2[i].PreviousBidRatio[0];} 
   for(int i=0;i<s.length;i++){ 
   for(int k=0;k<CriterionPerSet-1;k++)ReserveTemp[i][k]=ReserveTemp[i][k+1]; 
   ReserveTemp[i][CriterionPerSet-1]=s[i].PreviousBidRatio[0]; } 
  }//;else continuously update the temporal storage set; 
 } 
  
 void TestEquilibrium(AuctionBuyer1[] ab1, AuctionBuyer2[] ab2, Seller[] s, ModelPSO 
m,SpotMarket dm,int e,int parameterNo){ 
  if(JudgeEquilibrium==true)return;   
  double mean[]=new double[2];double std[]=new double[2]; 
  double cr[]=new double[CriterionPerSet];double mp[]=new double[CriterionPerSet]; 
  double h[]=new double[2]; 
  boolean EorNot=false; 
  /*1st, test if market price reach equilibrium for one selected market*/ 
  System.arraycopy(MarketBidTemp1, 0, mp, 0, mp.length);MeanDeviation(mp,h,e,-1); 
  if(h[1]>JudgeDevCR[0])return; 
  System.arraycopy(MarketBidTemp2, 0, mp, 0, mp.length);MeanDeviation(mp,h,e,-1); 
  if(h[1]>JudgeDevCR[0])return; 
  System.arraycopy(rTemp, 0, mp, 0, mp.length);MeanDeviation(mp,h,e,-1); 
  if(h[1]>JudgeDevCR[0])return;   
   
  /*2nd, test if buyers' strategy parameters reach equilibrium for one selected market;*/ 
  for(int i=0;i<ab1.length;i++){ 
   System.arraycopy(CommonValueBidTemp1[i], 0,cr, 0, cr.length);   
   MeanDeviation(cr,h,e,-1); 
   if(h[1]>JudgeDevCR[0])return;} 
  for(int i=0;i<ab2.length;i++){ 
   System.arraycopy(CommonValueBidTemp2[i], 0,cr, 0, cr.length);   
   MeanDeviation(cr,h,e,-1); 
   if(h[1]>JudgeDevCR[0])return;} 
  for(int i=0;i<s.length;i++){ 
   System.arraycopy(ReserveTemp[i], 0,cr, 0, cr.length);   
   MeanDeviation(cr,h,e,-1); 
   if(h[1]>JudgeDevCR[0])return;} 
  /*If the above two tests return true value, test if each buyer has same strategy parameters 
in every parallel market;*/  
  for(int i=0;i<ab1.length;i++){ 
   for(int 
k=0;k<m.ParallelMarket;k++)CommonValueBidTemp1[i][k]=ab1[i].PreviousBidRatio[k]; 
   System.arraycopy(CommonValueBidTemp1[i], 0,cr, 0, cr.length);   
   MeanDeviation(cr,h,e,-1); 
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   if(h[1]<=JudgeDevCR[0])continue; 
   else return;} 
  for(int i=0;i<ab2.length;i++){ 
   for(int 
k=0;k<m.ParallelMarket;k++)CommonValueBidTemp2[i][k]=ab2[i].PreviousBidRatio[k]; 
   System.arraycopy(CommonValueBidTemp2[i], 0,cr, 0, cr.length);   
   MeanDeviation(cr,h,e,-1); 
   if(h[1]<=JudgeDevCR[0])continue; 
   else return;} 
  for(int i=0;i<s.length;i++){    
   for(int 
k=0;k<m.ParallelMarket;k++)ReserveTemp[i][k]=s[i].PreviousBidRatio[k]; 
   System.arraycopy(ReserveTemp[i], 0,cr, 0, cr.length);   
   MeanDeviation(cr,h,e,-1); 
   if(h[1]<=JudgeDevCR[0])continue; 
   else return;}     
  JudgeEquilibrium=true; 
 } 
  
 void StorageBuyer1(AuctionBuyer1[] ab1, int e){ 
  int l=CriterionPerSet; 
  MeanDeviation(MarketBidTemp1,MarketBid1 , e,l); 
  for(int i=0;i<ab1.length;i++) 
MeanDeviation(CommonValueBidTemp1[i],CommonValueBid1[i],e,l);} 
 void StorageBuyer2(AuctionBuyer2[] ab2, int e){ 
  int l=CriterionPerSet; 
  MeanDeviation(MarketBidTemp2,MarketBid2 , e,l); 
  for(int i=0;i<ab2.length;i++) 
MeanDeviation(CommonValueBidTemp2[i],CommonValueBid2[i],e,l);} 
 void StorageSellers(Seller[] s, int e){ 
  int l=CriterionPerSet; 
  MeanDeviation(rTemp,ReserveRandom , e,l); 
  for(int i=0;i<s.length;i++) MeanDeviation(ReserveTemp[i],Reserve[i],e,l);//} 
  
 void MeanDeviation(double[] d,double[] h,int e,int l){ 
  if(e<d.length)return; 
  double temp=0,temp1=0; 
  int begin=0; 
  if(l<0){l=d.length;begin=0;} 
  else begin=d.length-l; 
  for(int k=begin;k<d.length;k++){ 
  temp+=d[k];} 
  temp=temp/(double)l; 
  h[0]=temp;//storage parameter mean 
  for(int k=begin;k<d.length;k++)temp1+=(temp-d[k])*(temp-d[k]);   
  h[1]=Math.abs(Math.sqrt(temp1/(l-1)));//storage parameter deviation; 
std=Math.sqrt(temp1/(d.length-1));  
 } 
}// End of Equilibrium Criterion 
 
/* ******************Parameters **************************************************/ 
package PSOmpr; 
import java.util.Arrays; 
public class Criterion { 
 static int CriterionNo=1; 
 static boolean AlgorithmParameterFixed=false;//true; 
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 static boolean MarketStructureFixed=true; 
 //Fixed parameter  
 double[] w    ={.4,  .4,  .4,  .1 };//inertia weight 
 double[] c1   ={1.5,  1,  .5,   1};//self  confidence factor 
 double[] c2   ={1.5,  1,  .5,   1};//swarm confidence factor 
static double[] wup  ={ .75, .75,   .98,    .98   }; 
 static double[] cup ={ .75,   .5,   .4,    1.5,  }; 
 static int[] Converge ={ 400, 400,   400,    400  }; 
 static int[] pm ={ 5, 10,  3}; 
 static int[] localTest={ 3,  3,  3}; 
 double[]   MarketPrice; 
 double[] MarketBid1;double[] MarketBid2; 
 double[][] CommonValueBid1;double[][] CommonValueBid2; 
 double[]   Time; 
 double[]   Iteration; 
 double[]   EquilibriumIteration;double[]   EquilibriumTime; 
 double[]   EquilibriumMarketBid1;double[][] EquilibriumBidRatio1;double[][] 
EquilibriumBidRatio2; 
 double[] EquilibriumMarketBid2; 
 double[][] EquilibriumReserveRatio; 
 double[] EquilibriumReserve; 
 double[] ReservePrice; 
 double[][] ReserveTemp; 
  
 Criterion(ModelPSO m){ 
  Iteration=new double[2]; 
  Time=new double[2]; 
  MarketPrice=new double[2];MarketBid1= new double[2];MarketBid2= new double[2]; 
  CommonValueBid1=new double[m.TotalbuyerNumber][2];CommonValueBid2=new 
double[m.TotalbuyerNumber][2]; 
  EquilibriumIteration=new double[m.EquilibriumNo];  
  EquilibriumTime=new double[m.EquilibriumNo];    
  EquilibriumMarketBid1=new double[m.EquilibriumNo];   EquilibriumBidRatio1=new 
double[m.TotalbuyerNumber][m.EquilibriumNo];  
  EquilibriumBidRatio2=new double[m.TotalbuyerNumber][m.EquilibriumNo]; 
EquilibriumMarketBid2=new double[m.EquilibriumNo]; 
  EquilibriumReserve=new double[m.EquilibriumNo]; 
  EquilibriumReserveRatio =new double[m.TotalsellerNumber][m.EquilibriumNo]; 
  ReservePrice=new double[2]; 
  ReserveTemp=new double[m.TotalsellerNumber][2]; } 
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